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THE COST OF SECURITIES FRAUD
URSKA VELIKONJA*
ABSTRACT
Under the dominant account, fraudulent financial reporting by
public firms harms the firms’ shareholders and, more generally,
capital markets. This Article contends that the account is incomplete.
In addition to undermining investor confidence, misreporting dis-
torts economic decision making by all firms, both those committing
fraud and those not. False information impairs risk assessment by
those who provide human or financial capital to fraudulent firms,
the firms’ suppliers and customers, and thus misdirects capital and
labor to subpar projects. Efforts to hide fraud and avoid detection
further distort fraudulent firms’ business decisions, as well as de-
cisions by their rivals, who mimic or respond to what appears to be
a profitable business strategy. 
If fraud is caught, managers externalize part of the cost of liti-
gation and enforcement to employees, creditors, suppliers, and the
government as the insurer of last resort. Mounting empirical evidence
suggests that harm to nonshareholders dwarfs that suffered by
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defrauded shareholders. Moreover, unlike investors, who can limit
their exposure to securities fraud by diversifying their holdings and
demanding a fraud discount, other market participants cannot easily
self-insure. The Article supplies both theoretical and empirical sup-
port for the assertion that defrauded investors are not the only
victims of accounting fraud. In conclusion, the Article outlines and
assesses some alternative fraud deterrence and compensation mech-
anisms.
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INTRODUCTION
Just over ten years ago, on June 25, 2002, WorldCom announced
that its financial disclosures were fiction.1 Accounting fraud at
WorldCom ultimately destroyed tens of billions of dollars in in-
vestors’ equity and pushed the firm into bankruptcy.2 When it
emerged two years later as MCI, Inc., it had shed 33,000 em-
ployees,3 more than a third of its workforce.4 Its general unsecured
creditors ultimately received only thirty-six cents on the dollar.5
While WorldCom was fabricating its financials, its rivals, Sprint
and AT&T, made business decisions believing that WorldCom’s
success was real. Under pressure from its own shareholders, AT&T
cut $7.5 billion in costs and laid off 20,000 employees.6 Still
unable to compete with WorldCom’s imaginary figures, AT&T split
itself into three units, which were sold individually—a decision
then, and now, widely viewed as value destroying.7 In fact, during
the fraud, WorldCom’s true costs were higher than AT&T’s.8
Telecommunications equipment manufacturers, including Lucent
Technologies and Nortel Networks, initially benefitted from
1. DENNIS R. BERESFORD ET AL., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE
COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF WORLDCOM, INC. 2 (2003), available at http://
news.findlaw.com/wsj/docs/worldcom/bdspcomm60903rpt.pdf.
2. Id. Before fraud was unmasked, WorldCom was one of the largest telecommunications
companies, with $160 billion in assets. Ken Belson, WorldCom’s Audacious Failure and Its
Toll on an Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2005, at C1.
3. Edward J. Romar & Mactin Calkins, WorldCom Case Study Update 2006, MARKKULA
CENTER FOR APPLIED ETHICS, http://www.scu.edu/ethics/dialogue/candc/cases/worldcom-
update.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2013).
4. See Steve Alexander, Former Holders of MCI Stock Miss Out: The Bidding War for
MCI Will Enrich the Firm’s Shareholders—the Current Ones, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St.
Paul), May 1, 2005, at D1.
5. See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of WorldCom, Inc. v. SEC, 467 F.3d 73, 84-
85 (2d Cir. 2006) (limiting the distribution of the SEC Fair Fund proceeds to those investors
who had recovered less than thirty-six cents on the dollar).
6. Rebecca Blumenstein & Peter Grant, On the Hook: Former Chief Tries to Redeem Calls
He Made at AT&T, WALL ST. J., May 26, 2004, at A1.
7. Id.
8. Id.; see also Gil Sadka, The Economic Consequences of Accounting Fraud in Product
Markets: Theory and a Case from the U.S. Telecommunications Industry (WorldCom), 8 AM.
L. & ECON. REV. 439, 459 (2006) (showing that AT&T and Sprint performed much better than
WorldCom between 1999 and 2002, the period of fraud).
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WorldCom’s apparent success but suffered when the industry re-
trenched after the fraud was revealed. Both suppliers fired workers
and saw their equity shrink.9 In the aftermath of the WorldCom
fraud, the telecommunications industry as a whole lost a quarter of
its jobs: 300,000.10 WorldCom’s share price, the usual yardstick for
measuring harm from securities fraud, captured none of these
losses. 
WorldCom might be an outlier, but it is hardly unique.11 By mis-
reporting their firm’s financial results and prospects, managers
credibly communicate to markets12 that the firm is more profitable
and, importantly, less risky than it in fact is. Managers sell the lie
by increasing hiring and investment, and cutting prices. Relying on
false information, lenders underprice credit, employees make career
and retirement decisions based on a false picture of their firm’s
prosperity, and rivals make business decisions on a distorted
playing field.13 Honest firms face the obverse side of fraud and
cannot fund and employ workers for valuable projects, producing
additional deadweight losses borne by all workers, primary-market
investors, and beyond. 
If fraud is caught, fraudulent firms spend substantial resources
on investigation, litigation, damages, and fines. Many file for bank-
ruptcy that could have been avoided in the absence of fraud, or
make costly adjustments that they often shift to employees, cred-
itors, suppliers, customers, and the government as the insurer of
last resort.14 Rivals face doubts about their own financial reporting,
which increases their cost of capital and further depresses hiring in
9. Romar & Calkins, supra note 3.
10. See Belson, supra note 2, at C1, C4.
11. But see Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, “Publicness” in Contemporary
Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337, 374-75 (2013) (suggesting that
WorldCom and Enron were different because of their size). 
12. The Article uses the term “markets” broadly to include capital and labor markets,
product markets, as well as intermediate markets. An appropriate adjective is included
whenever the term is used narrowly—for example, securities markets.
13. See Cynthia A. Glassman, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Financial Reform:
Relevance and Reality in Financial Reporting (Sept. 16, 2003), available at http://www.sec.
gov/news/speech/spch091603cag.htm. One might also add to the list: suppliers, vendors,
customers, communities, and the government as the insurer of last resort. See John C. Coffee,
Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1, 72
(1986). 
14. See Coffee, supra note 13, at 67-72.
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the industry. The ripple effects are felt throughout the economy and,
once aggregated, exceed the harms to defrauded shareholders by a
substantial margin.15
Not only are investors not the sole victims of securities fraud, but
this Article contends that they are also in a better position than
other market participants to reduce their exposure to fraud.16
They can eliminate firm-specific risk through diversification.
Diversification cannot eliminate undiversifiable or market risk of
fraud, but investors demand a fraud discount when purchasing sec-
urities as ex ante compensation. Although investors as a group
benefit if the prevalence of fraud decreases, they are indifferent to
accounting fraud if its impact remains stable. Those supplying
labor, on the other hand, cannot diversify their human capital at all
and are exposed to the risk that securities fraud by their employer
will eliminate their jobs and impair their earning potential.17
Surprisingly, the recognition that investors do not bear the full
cost of securities fraud is largely missing from our securities laws—
from statutes to rule making,18 enforcement decisions to judicial
opinions,19 and policy debates20 to academic analysis.21 Corporate
15. No model built to date can provide a solid estimate of the aggregate cost of fraud. See
Abigail Bugbee Brown, Private Firms Working in the Public Interest: Is the Financial
Statement Audit System Broken? 19-29, 36 (Oct. 2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Pardee RAND Graduate School) (on file with author) (concluding that although it is very
“difficult to properly measure the costs of fraudulent financial statements,” “fraud is costly
to society, perhaps extremely costly”). Two empirical studies measured the effect of accounting
fraud on the stock prices of rivals. Both found that aggregate equity market losses by rivals
exceed those by fraudulent firms by a factor of four. See Art Durnev & Claudine Mangen,
Corporate Investments: Learning from Restatements, 47 J. ACCT. RES. 679, 699 (2009); Eitan
Goldman et al., Financial Misrepresentation and Its Impact on Rivals, FIN. MGMT.
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 27 fig.3), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=774364. Other
studies cited in Parts III and IV infra have found evidence of cost shifting to labor and product
markets, and reduced investment after revelation of fraud.
16. This statement assumes the firm did not issue new securities while it was manipu-
lating its financial statements.
17. See discussion infra Part III.A.2, B.1.
18. The Dodd-Frank Act, for example, put in place a variety of mechanisms designed to
empower shareholders. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 971(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1915 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act].
19. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 729 (1975). 
20. See COMM’N ON THE REGULATION OF U.S. CAPITAL MKTS. IN THE 21ST CENTURY, REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 12 (2007), available at http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/
reports/0703capmarkets_full.pdf (concluding that the purposes of securities regulation are
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governance reforms adopted in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act after the
rash of accounting scandals in 2001 and 2002 were widely criticized
because of their purportedly high cost for firms and their sharehold-
ers.22 Based on a similarly cramped understanding of the economic
cost of fraud, the recently adopted JOBS Act relaxed reporting and
audit requirements for new public firms.23 
Securities commentators frequently warn that “onerous disclosure
obligations and their accompanying liability are like the rain—they
fall on the good and the bad alike.”24 But securities fraud, too, harms
both honest and dishonest firms, as well as their employees, cred-
itors, and other constituents. With all costs included and tallied, the
following conclusions are inescapable: (1) false disclosures affect
financial markets as well as markets for inputs, labor and credit,
and product markets; (2) framing financial statement fraud as fraud
against investors understates the harm it causes; and (3) regulation
and enforcement predicated on the assumption that securities fraud
does not impose substantial negative externalities on nonshare-
holders leads to underregulation and underdeterrence of fraud and
offers remedies that do not redress the injury.25 
investor protection and fostering capital formation).
21. The most commonly used securities regulation textbook lists a dozen articles for the
proposition that investors bear the social cost of securities fraud. See JAMES D. COX ET AL.,
SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 745-54 (6th ed. 2009). But see William W.
Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275, 1277 (2002)
(acknowledging that employees were harmed as a result of fraud at Enron).
22. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Sarbanes-Oxley: Legislating in Haste, Repenting in
Leisure, 2 CORP. GOVERNANCE L. REV. 69, 84-88 (2006) (criticizing the law because it increased
the costs of corporate compliance); Larry E. Ribstein, SarbOx: The Road to Nirvana, 2004
MICH. ST. L. REV. 279, 280; Roberta Romano, Regulating in the Dark, in REGULATORY
BREAKDOWN: THE CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE IN U.S. REGULATION 86 (Cary Coglianese ed., 2012)
(proposing sunset clauses for financial reform laws); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley
Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1526-29 (2005)
(arguing that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was unnecessary); Ivy Xiying Zhang, Economic
Consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Feb. 1, 2007) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=961964 (arguing that the passage of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act had a statistically significant negative impact on U.S. equity markets). 
23. See, e.g., Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-06, § 104, 126 Stat.
306, 310 (2012) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
24. COX ET AL., supra note 21, at 745.
25. Even if the cost calculus were adjusted, enforcement strategies might still underdeter
when the sanction is placed on the firm if the firm cannot effectively shift it to deter the
individuals who commit fraud. See, e.g., Urska Velikonja, Leverage, Sanctions, and Deterrence
of Accounting Fraud, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1281, 1307-12 (2011).
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In Part I, this Article provides a brief overview of securities laws
that require disclosure and sanction fraud. It also describes the
existing consensus that securities fraud harms primarily investors
by reducing capital market liquidity, depressing investor returns by
misallocating capital, and impairing shareholder monitoring. 
Parts II, III, and IV constitute the major contributions that this
Article makes to the literature. In Part II, the Article explains ana-
lytically how false securities disclosures distort and harm nonfinan-
cial markets. First, public firms’ financial disclosures are made
publicly, not only to present and future shareholders. Disclosed
information is useful to a variety of market participants. If false,
disclosures lead suppliers of financial as well as human capital to
underprice their inputs. Second, to avoid detection, managers
change the firms’ observable actions—they overinvest and overhire
—to match false disclosures. Thus, securities fraud interferes with
economic learning, distorts real economic decisions by rivals, and
impairs product markets. Third, if unmasked, accounting fraud is
very costly for the firm, and the managers often pass that cost on to
nonshareholders. In Parts III and IV, the Article details how false
financial disclosures specifically harm employees and rivals. In each
Part, the Article supplements the theoretical analysis with empiri-
cal evidence. 
In Part V, the Article discusses the determinants of the cost of
financial statement fraud. Not surprisingly, fraud by a larger firm
and larger fraud relative to the size of the firm tend to produce a
greater market distortion and cost.26 Less well known, competition
has a profound effect on the prevalence and the cost of securities
fraud. First, fraud is generally more likely in concentrated than in
competitive markets. But, during investment booms, when competi-
tive pressure weakens, previously competitive markets succumb to
fraud. Fraud is procyclical and exacerbates underlying dynamics of
overinvestment and overhiring. Second, false disclosures by firms
in concentrated markets are more likely to distort decision making
by rivals. Third, market concentration amplifies the ability of
managers to shift the cost of fraud from shareholders to non-
shareholders.
26. See Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 11, at 374-75. 
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Finally, in Part VI, the Article discusses the implications of the
research and proposes a few responses. If the cost of fraud falls on
market participants other than investors, then self-regulation
through corporate governance in which only investors have a say
will have a limited effect and predictable consequences. Regulation
may be necessary, but it is unclear that securities regulation and
corporate law are the proper vehicles because they focus on the role
and the rights of shareholders.27 One worthwhile experiment might
be to further reduce the lingering agency problems present in public
accounting, where the firm chooses its accounting firm and its man-
agers supply the auditor with information. Forensic audits and qui
tam actions for whistleblowers might produce superior deterrence
outcomes at the same cost if traded off for less effective compliance
tools. Additionally, forcing managers to internalize a larger portion
of the cost of securities fraud would improve their incentives to
avoid fraud.28 Finally, the Article considers two compensation mech-
anisms for victims of securities fraud other than shareholders: class
actions and administrative remedies. It concludes that, although
common law actions for fraud are possible, these suits face high
hurdles of reliance and quantification of damages. Unlike private
plaintiffs, the SEC does not need to show actual reliance or damages
to find a violation and impose a civil fine. The Article considers
whether the SEC has the authority, under the Fair Funds Statute
in section 308 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, to distribute civil fines and
disgorged profits it collects from securities violators to nonshare-
holder victims.29 A close reading of the text of the statute and the
legislative history suggests that the case for compensating non-
shareholder victims is surprisingly strong. The fact that the SEC
could compensate nonshareholder victims of fraud does not imply
that it should. Instead, the Article concludes that the SEC should
stop compensating shareholders.
27. Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder
Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 644 (2006).
28. In my earlier writing, I have proposed a mechanism for shifting a greater share of the
cost from firms to individual wrongdoers. See Velikonja, supra note 25.
29. 15 U.S.C. § 7246(a) (2006) (authorizing the SEC to distribute to victims of securities
violations disgorgement funds and civil penalties it collects from defendants).
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I. THE REGULATION OF SECURITIES FRAUD
The Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act were adopted
in the wake of the 1929 stock market crash and the Great
Depression that followed.30 The securities acts put in place safe-
guards to prevent history from repeating itself, including a system
of mandatory public disclosure and sanctions for disclosure viola-
tions and fraud. This Part reviews the laws that mandate disclo-
sure; the laws punishing missing, false, or fraudulent disclosures;
and the existing literature. 
A. A Summary of Regulation
Modern American securities regulation has two prongs: regula-
tion of securities markets and the securities industry; and regu-
lation of corporate issuers, including mandatory disclosure, the
prohibition of fraud, and, more recently, corporate governance.31
Disclosure-based regulation aims to reduce the information asym-
metry between firms that offer securities and investors who buy
them.32 It assumes that so long as investors have access to informa-
tion about the issuers of securities and the rights those securities
confer, they can assess the risks and the returns of investment
products and decide whether and at what price to buy or sell. 
To that end, the securities acts and implementing regulations
require firms to disclose relevant information about their financial
condition, products and markets, management, and competitive
30. The crash harmed “thousands of individuals who invested their life savings,
accumulated after years of effort.” H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 2 (1933).
31. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477 (1977) (explaining that the
fundamental purpose of the Exchange Act was to substitute the policy of caveat emptor with
full disclosure).
32. Few remember today that the original draft of federal securities laws proposed merit
review of securities offerings. See S. 875, 73d Cong. § 6(c), (e), (f) (1933), reprinted in 3
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF
1934, at Item 28 (1973) (authorizing revocation of an issuer’s registration upon a finding “that
the enterprise or business of the issue, or person, or the security is not based upon sound
principles, and that the revocation is in the interest of the public welfare,” or that the issuer
“is in any other way dishonest” or “in an unsound condition or insolvent”).
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and regulatory climate.33 Firms must disclose information both
episodically—whenever they offer securities to the public34—and
periodically thereafter—annually, quarterly, and whenever signif-
icant events warrant disclosure.35 Regulations S-K and S-X specify
not only what information must be disclosed but also when, and in
what manner, to produce disclosures that are easily comparable
across firms.36 
To induce compliance, securities laws prohibit and punish firms
for disclosures that are materially false, misleading, or, in some
cases, missing, and entrust private and public agents with enforce-
ment.37 The securities acts do not make firms liable for every
inaccurate disclosure. A misrepresentation must be important—or
“material” in securities regulation parlance—and the materiality is
measured by the significance of the misrepresentation to a reason-
able investor.38 
In addition, the misrepresentation or omission must be related to
a purchase or sale of securities.39 A firm can be held liable for
33. See Securities Act of 1933 sched. A, 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (2006 & Supp. V 2012).
34. See id. § 77e(b)(2), (c).
35. See Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml (last visited Mar. 26, 2013) (explaining that the
Securities Exchange Act requires certain companies to “file annual and other periodic
reports”).
36. See Samuel W. Buell, What Is Securities Fraud?, 61 DUKE L.J. 511, 570 (2011)
(observing that an effective system of disclosure must make disclosures mandatory and
uniform); Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is Not
Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1376-78 (1999) (explaining that before 1933, both
the quantity and the quality of disclosures between issuers varied considerably, making
comparisons between firms impossible).
37. Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act prohibits the use of “any manipulative or deceptive
device” “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.” 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). The Act
authorizes the SEC to develop more specific rules about prohibited activities, as necessary “in
the public interest or for the protection of investors.” Id. The SEC exercised its statutory auth-
ority to the fullest when it adopted Rule 10b-5, prohibiting not only false statements of fact
or omissions that make truthful affirmative statements misleading but also schemes or arti-
fices to defraud and acts or practices that operate as frauds or deceits. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(2012). This Article focuses on false disclosures, not inaccurate stock prices that result from
all three types of securities fraud. 
38. For the most recent elaboration of the principle of materiality, see Matrixx Initiatives,
Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1318 (2011) (quoting the standard as “a substantial
likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable
investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
39. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 174 (3d Cir. 2000); 17
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securities fraud even if the purpose of the misleading statement was
not to influence investors but rather its customers, employees, or
others, and even if defendants did not envision that investors would
rely on the statement.40 The fact that the material misstatement
was disseminated in a medium on which investors could rely is
sufficient.41 
Finally, securities laws not only prohibit fraudulent misrepre-
sentations but also hold issuers and insiders liable for reckless—
and in some cases, negligent or innocent—misrepresentations.42 The
securities acts distinguish between primary offerings, where the
firm offers new securities to investors, and secondary market trans-
actions in the firm’s existing securities between investors.43
Innocent material financial misrepresentations must be corrected
or restated.44 In addition, innocent misrepresentations made during
a primary offering expose the issuer itself to liability but do not
subject the issuer to fines or other sanctions.45 Negligent misrepre-
sentations in primary offerings expose those involved in the offering,
including the issuer’s officers, directors, underwriters, and accoun-
tants, to both liability and sanctions.46 Reckless or fraudulent mis-
representations expose firms and their agents to liability even when
the firm does not directly benefit from fraud by selling overpriced
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(c).
40. Semerenko, 223 F.3d at 176-77.
41. Id. (holding that acquirer shareholders could rely on statements made in a tender offer
to target shareholders); In re Carter-Wallace, Inc. Sec. Litig., 150 F.3d 153, 156-57 (2d Cir.
1998) (holding that an advertisement in a medical journal is made “in connection with” the
purchase or sale of securities if relied upon by market professionals).
42. In a fine recent article, Samuel Buell explores the many different mental states that
the courts have upheld as sufficient for establishing “securities fraud,” from specific intent to
defraud to mere lack of due care. See Buell, supra note 36, at 556-58.
43. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 77k, with 15 U.S.C. § 77q.
44. The SEC requires firms to disclose within four business days, by filing a form 8-K, that
prior financial statements should no longer be relied on, followed by a restatement in a
periodic or amended filing, such as an annual report on Form 10-K or quarterly report on
Form 10-Q. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-11, 240.15d-11 (2012); MARK CHEFFERS ET AL., 2009
FINANCIAL RESTATEMENTS: A NINE YEAR COMPARISON 1 (2010), available at http://www.
complianceweek.com/s/documents/AARestatements2010.pdf. About 40 percent of all restate-
ments are stealthy, revealed in a periodic report without a prior disclosure in Item 4.02 of a
Form 8-K. Id.
45. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)-(b).
46. See id. §§ 77k, 77q.
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securities but merely discloses materially misleading information
that leads its shareholders to trade.47 
Securities laws authorize public agencies such as the SEC and
federal prosecutors, self-regulatory organizations, such as FINRA,
and defrauded shareholders, who are considered the victims of mis-
representations, to enforce disclosure violations.48 Although share-
holders can only seek damages, other enforcement agents can seek
a variety of remedies, including injunctions, disgorgements, fines,
and imprisonment.49 
Two recent amendments to securities laws departed from the
shareholder-centric approach—in particular the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
and, to a much lesser extent, the Dodd-Frank Act.50 They imposed
a mix of corporate governance and compliance requirements on
public firms, designed to improve the accuracy of disclosures and re-
duce the temptation of fraudulent disclosures. These requirements
include enhanced auditing and financial reporting, a ban on corpor-
ate loans to executives that might tempt them to cheat, increased
reliance on independent directors as monitors, and whistleblower
incentives.51
B. Existing Thought on the Harm from Securities Fraud
Congress adopted the securities acts in the 1930s with two goals
in mind: to protect investors, who “were unfairly robbed of their
investments during the stock market collapse of 1929,”52 and to
further the public interest by preventing securities fraud and
manipulation, which “precipitate, intensify, and prolong” “[n]ational
47. That is, misrepresentation of a known fact made with the purpose to mislead. United
States v. Piepgrass, 425 F.2d 194, 199-200 (9th Cir. 1970); Rice v. United States, 149 F.2d
601, 603 (10th Cir. 1945). 
48. For a discussion of the comparative advantages of different enforcers of securities
violations, see James J. Park, Rules, Principles, and the Competition to Enforce the Securities
Laws, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 115 (2012).
49. See id. at 138, 157.
50. Donald C. Langevoort, The Social Construction of Sarbanes-Oxley, 105 MICH. L. REV.
1817, 1828-33 (2007) (arguing that the Act’s provisions were animated by the desire to make
public companies publicly accountable).
51. See id. at 1822-24, 1830-31, 1844.
52. Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the
International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903, 941 (1998).
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emergencies, which produce widespread unemployment and ... affect
the public welfare.”53 
Since then, courts and commentators have settled on a narrower
understanding of what securities fraud and fraudulent financial
reporting, its most common incarnation, harm54: securities mar-
kets.55 
When fraud is revealed, the price of the firm’s equity declines and
its shareholders lose money. Fraud at a large firm like Enron or
WorldCom can cause tens of billions of dollars in market capitaliza-
tion to evaporate. Alarming as such declines might be, they over-
state the loss to investors. For every shareholder who overpaid,
there is an equally innocent shareholder who sold at an inflated
price. Investors with diversified portfolios are as likely to be sellers
as to be buyers of fraudulent stock, so, on average, investors’ ex-
pected cost of fraud over time approximates zero, assuming no
insider trading.56 
53. Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act,
42 STAN. L. REV. 385, 392 n.30, 426 n.180 (1990). Section 2 of the Securities Exchange Act
talks about manipulation, excessive speculation, and “sudden and unreasonable fluctuations
in the prices of securities,” which has led some to argue that the Act was concerned primarily
with manipulation and integrity of stock prices, not with “full and honest disclosure or the
importance of information about issuers.” Id. at 391-92 & n.30. But surely, the Act as it has
subsequently been applied by the Supreme Court is not unconcerned with misleading
disclosures. See, e.g., Matrixx Incentives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309 (2011); Sante Fe
Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
54. See MARK S. BEASLEY ET AL., COMM. OF SPONSORING ORGS. OF THE TREADWAY COMM’N,
FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING 1998-2007: AN ANALYSIS OF U.S. PUBLIC COMPANIES 17-
18 (2010), available at http://www.coso.org/documents/COSOFRAUDSTUDY2010_001.PDF
(reporting that 14 percent of SEC enforcement actions included misappropriating assets,
while most of the rest involved “intentionally misstating financial statement information”);
CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS: 2011 YEAR IN REVIEW 28
fig.26 (2012), available at http://securities.stanford.edu/clearinghouse_research/2011_YIR/
Cornerstone_Research_Filings_2011_YIR.pdf (reporting that 94 percent of class actions filed
in 2011 alleged misrepresentations in financial documents, a percentage that has remained
stable over the years).
55. The courts have identified at least eight separate policies underlying the rule against
securities fraud: “(1) maintaining free securities markets; (2) equalizing access to information;
(3) insuring equal bargaining strength; (4) providing for disclosure; (5) protecting investors;
(6) assuring fairness; (7) building investor confidence; and (8) deterring violations while
compensating victims.” 5B ARNOLD S. JACOBS, DISCLOSURE AND REMEDIES UNDER THE
SECURITIES LAWS § 6:4 (2012). Professor Miriam Baer recently observed that “most
commentators would agree ... [that] fraud is bad for the securities markets.” Miriam Hechler
Baer, Insuring Corporate Crime, 83 IND. L.J. 1035, 1076 (2008).
56. To quote Judge Posner, “Often the net measurable damages from a stock fraud will
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If crooked managers reduce their stockholdings while cooking the
books,57 financial statement fraud will injure even diversified in-
vestors because insider trading transfers value from public investors
to insiders who sell their stock at inflated prices. But that transfer
is much smaller than the aggregate decline in the price of affected
stock because insiders’ sales represent only a small fraction of ag-
gregate transactions in the stock.58 More importantly, a prudent
investor diversifies anyway, so there is no incremental cost to di-
versify in the face of fraud. Assuming that investors fully internalize
the costs of fraud, a number of courts and commentators have
concluded that the measure of ill-gotten gains from insider trading
is the net social cost of fraud.59
The literature that followed recognized three additional catego-
ries of costs from fraud. Professor Paul Mahoney observed that the
transfer of value from public investors to insiders is not costless
because it affects how investors behave.60 Burglaries lead people to
be zero.” Richard A. Posner, Law and the Theory of Finance: Some Intersections, 54 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 159, 169 (1986); see also Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in
Securities Class Actions, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1487, 1502 (1996) (arguing that diversification and
frequent trading effectively protect investors against securities fraud); Richard A. Booth, The
End of the Securities Fraud Class Action as We Know It, 4 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 1, 10-11 (2007)
(contending that investors can fully protect themselves from securities fraud losses by
diversifying their holdings). But see Alicia J. Davis, Are Investors’ Gains and Losses from
Securities Fraud Equal over Time? Theory and Evidence 31-32 (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch.
Empirical Legal Studies Ctr., Working Paper No. 09-002, 2010), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=1121198 (finding that while it is true that investors’ expected losses ex ante
approximate zero, the losses they suffer take a range of values).
57. See, e.g., Simi Kedia & Thomas Philippon, The Economics of Fraudulent Accounting,
22 REV. FIN. STUD. 2169, 2170 & fig.1 (2009) (noting that Enron insiders sold millions of
dollars worth of Enron stock while fraud was ongoing, but billions in fact changed hands
during that time).
58. See Richard A. Booth, What Is a Business Crime?, 3 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 127, 142-43
(2008) (arguing that absent insider trading, investor losses equal investor gains).
59. See Siebel v. Scott, 725 F.2d 995, 1001-02 (5th Cir. 1984); Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d
781, 786-87 (1st Cir. 1965); A.C. Pritchard, Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific-
Atlanta: The Political Economy of Securities Class Action Reform, 2007-2008 CATO SUP. CT.
REV. 217, 219 (arguing that disgorgement of unlawful gains is the right measure of damages
for securities fraud because it approximates the social costs of fraud). But see Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. REV.
611, 651-52 (1985) (arguing that damages should be based on the offenders’ acts rather than
profits).
60. See Paul G. Mahoney, Precaution Costs and the Law of Fraud in Impersonal Markets,
78 VA. L. REV. 623, 631 (1992) (noting that if the legal system did not deter fraud, investors
would take greater precautions against it). A transfer of value from one party to another is
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take precautions—including buying heavier locks, handguns, or safe
deposit boxes, all of which are direct costs—and to reduce their
willingness to buy expensive jewelry in the first place, an opportu-
nity cost.61 Similarly, because of securities fraud, investors might
spend resources trying to verify the truthfulness of disclosures
before investing.62 Some investors might stay away from equity
markets for fear that they would lose systematically to better in-
formed traders and insiders, thereby marginally reducing securities
market liquidity and increasing the cost of assembling and main-
taining a diversified portfolio of securities.63 Both effects depress the
price that investors are willing to pay for newly issued and existing
securities, thereby increasing the cost of new capital for firms and
reducing returns for existing investors. In the absence of fraud,
firms could issue new securities at higher prices. Existing investors
who have already purchased securities, on the other hand, are
neutral if the level of fraud remains stable over time. If it declines,
the value of their portfolios should increase to reflect the lower risk
of fraud; if it rises, the value of their portfolios should decline.
Second, managers and insiders benefit from false disclosures.64 To
reduce their incentive to lie, or to look the other way, enforcement
is necessary to confront the malefactors with the cost of their vio-
lation.65 Enforcement costs—the costs of “unmasking the offense,”
not a social cost per se. But, a zero-cost transfer assumes perfect competition, information,
substitution, and rationality, as well as zero transaction costs. When these assumptions are
relaxed, as they must be, all transfers will produce social deadweight losses.
61. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON.
169, 171 (1968) (arguing that precaution is a large element of the social cost of crime, but it
remains unaccounted for). 
62. But see Mahoney, supra note 60, at 631 (noting that investors take few precautions
because of legal prohibitions against fraud).
63. See Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of “Inaccurate” Stock Prices,
41 DUKE L.J. 977, 1043 (1992).
64. A misrepresentation in a registration statement prepared for a primary offering yields
an immediate and direct benefit to the firm as investors overpay for securities that the firm
and its insiders sell. A misrepresentation in a firm’s periodic disclosure produces a less direct
and usually smaller benefit to the firm because the firm does not capture the entire increase
in its stock price, though it enables the firm to make cheap acquisitions using its own stock
or negotiate better loan terms. See, e.g., Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 451
(7th Cir. 1982) (listing cheap acquisitions and lower borrowing costs among the benefits to the
firm from fraudulent disclosure). 
65. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 349-50 (1972). It is irrelevant
from the social welfare standpoint whether the violator pays the cost to the victims or into
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conducting an internal and external investigation, and litigating
violations66—are substantial. 
Third and finally, misrepresentations tend to inflate stock prices
and thus upset the allocation of economic resources through two
separate mechanisms. In an ideal society, all projects would be rank
ordered based on their risk-adjusted expected returns.67 Assuming
that capital is scarce, not all projects can be funded. Fraudulent
firms attract capital and overinvest in low-yield projects, while
honest firms cannot fund good projects.68 The misallocation of cap-
ital reduces returns on equity investment and produces a dead-
weight loss to society from having foregone superior projects.69 
In addition, stock prices are used as a yardstick for managerial
compensation and retention. Professors Jennifer Arlen and Bill
Carney were the first to observe that managers commit fraud when
they fear that but for the false disclosure, they would be fired.70
Inaccurate disclosures mask poor performance and prevent value-
enhancing changes in management.71 In addition, knowing that
sanctions follow discovery, managers of fraudulent firms spend re-
sources trying to conceal fraud and avoid punishment.72 
Unlike the stock price decline, there is no obvious way to measure
the cost of financial misrepresentations to nonshareholder constitu-
ents and to the economy. In an influential treatise, Judge Frank
Easterbrook and Professor Daniel Fischel suggested that, except for
investors, all stakeholders can protect themselves effectively by
contract and thus suffer no harm from fraud.73 Professor Ray Ball
state coffers. See id.
66. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 59, at 623. 
67. Fox, supra note 36, at 1358.
68. Kahan, supra note 63, at 1010; see Tracy Yue Wang, Corporate Securities Fraud: An
Economic Analysis 16-18 (Apr. 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=500562 (explaining the dynamic theoretically).
69. Fox, supra note 36, at 1358-59. 
70. Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities
Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 701-03 & n.58.
71. See id. at 703. Note that the change in management can take place either by the
existing board of directors, who can fire the manager and find a better one, or by a different
board put in place after a change in control through a takeover. See Fox, supra note 36, at
1364 & n.66.
72. Posner, supra note 56, at 170; Qi Zhou, Contractual Mistake and Misrepresentation,
in CONTRACT LAW AND ECONOMICS 31, 41 (Gerrit De Geest ed., 2011).
73. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
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went further to suggest that employees, in particular, benefit when
a firm’s managers engage in financial misreporting because misre-
porting delays business failure.74 
Other commentators have left room for the possibility that wide-
spread securities fraud could harm nonfinancial markets. Professor
Marcel Kahan suggested that inaccurate stock prices could precipi-
tate a recession.75 Professor Bill Bratton observed that the blind
pursuit of shareholder value at Enron was not in the interest of
society, and even shareholders themselves.76 In an influential recent
article, Professors Don Langevoort and Bob Thompson argue that
fraud by the largest firms could result in large social harm, but
fraud by their smaller peers could not.77 
The approach taken by the securities regulators has largely
followed the commentators’ lead. Shareholders, who act on the false
disclosure and change their position for the worse, are perceived as
the primary victims of securities fraud.78 The law gives them a pri-
vate right of action for damages and entitles them to the fair funds:
CORPORATE LAW 35-37 (1991) (observing that employees make firm-specific investments, but
arguing that nonshareholder groups can protect themselves adequately through contract); see
also Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities, Firm-Specific Capital Investments, and the Legal
Treatment of Fundamental Corporate Changes, 1989 DUKE L.J. 173, 188-92 (noting that firm-
specific capital can be adequately protected by contract).
74. Professor Ball assumes that business failure is inevitable; fraud does not increase the
odds of bankruptcy. At least for the firms that get caught for fraud, the assumption appears
unrealistic, given the high cost of investigation and sanctions. See Ray Ball, Market and
Political/Regulatory Perspectives on the Recent Accounting Scandals, 47 J. ACCT. RES. 277,
297-99 (2009).
75. Kahan, supra note 63, at 1034-35. But see MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSON
SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1867-1960, at 691-92 (1963) (arguing
that misguided monetary policy caused the Great Depression).
76. Bratton, supra note 21, at 1360-61.
77. Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 11, at 374-75. They observed that accounting
frauds in WorldCom and Enron caused “immense pain to employees and retirees,” cost their
competitors billions of dollars, and severely distorted the regulated markets in which the two
firms operated. Id. The reason for the large social harm associated with the fraud was the
firms’ size, while financial manipulation at smaller firms produces harms that are local and
contained. Id.
78. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730-31 (1975) (affirming
the rule first adopted in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952), that
a person who is neither a purchaser nor a seller of securities may not bring an action under
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act). 
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disgorgements of wrongful profits and civil fines that the SEC
collects from securities violators.79 
The injured-shareholder-centric understanding of the harm from
financial statement fraud suggests that false disclosures cause
relatively little harm, which has led lawmakers, regulators, the
business community, and academic commentators to express con-
cerns about the cost of compliance and overenforcement of fraud.80
Responding to the sentiment that the cost of compliance had
depressed job growth,81 Congress recently passed the JOBS Act to
allow newly public companies to produce more limited disclosures
than firms with a longer public tenure.82 The analysis and discus-
sion in the Parts that follow suggest that the rush to deregulate was
premised on an economically flawed assumption that investors bear
the entire cost of securities fraud. Once that assumption is relaxed,
the rationale for deregulation, as well as reforms designed to em-
power shareholders, largely disappears.83 
79. See 15 U.S.C. § 7246(a) (2006).
80. See, e.g., R. WILLIAM IDE, III, ABA TASK FORCE ON ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE,
REPORT TO ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES ON EMPLOYEE RIGHTS 17 (2006), available at
http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/attorneyclient/materials/hod/emprights_report_adopted 
.pdf (arguing that civil and criminal enforcement actions against fraud harmed firms,
“erode[d] individuals’ constitutional ... rights, [and] undermine[d] the role of lawyers”); ANJAN
THAKOR, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF
SECURITIES LITIGATION 1 (2005), available at http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/doc/the-
unintended-consequences-of-securities-litigation (asserting that sanctions in securities fraud
class actions overcompensate investors); U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, REPORT ON THE
CURRENT ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 2 (2006),
available at http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/reports/0603secenforcementstudy
.pdf (suggesting that the SEC had adopted an “overly punitive approach to enforcement”);
Mahoney, supra note 60, at 625-26 (arguing that the fraud on the market doctrine overdeters
voluntary disclosure by firms); Charles E. Schumer & Michael R. Bloomberg, To Save New
York, Learn from London, WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 2006, at A18 (suggesting that excessive
regulations force corporate leaders to spend time on compliance to the detriment of growth-
related activities).
81. See Examining Investor Risk in Capital Raising: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sec.,
Ins. & Inv. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 2 (2011)
(testimony of Professor John C. Coates IV).
82. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 102, 126 Stat. 306, 308-
10 (2012) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1) (providing for reduced disclosure and audit
requirements for “emerging growth companies”). Interestingly, 85 percent of qualifying firms
that went public after the adoption of the JOBS Act have opted to provide more robust
disclosures, for fear of turning off investors. Jessica Holzer, Some Firms Shun Looser IPO
Rules, WALL ST. J., Nov. 14., 2012, at C1.
83. For example, the Dodd-Frank Act grants shareholders the right to vote on executive
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II. OVERVIEW OF FINANCIAL MISREPRESENTATIONS
Securities fraud encompasses many different types of actions.84
This Article focuses on financial misrepresentations, also known as
fraudulent financial reporting or accounting fraud.85 They are not
only the most common species in the menagerie of securities fraud86
but also tend to be particularly harmful for the firm’s nonshare-
holder constituents and its rivals. 
Fraudulent financial reporting generates negative externalities
to nonshareholders. There is some evidence that these externalities
exceed the losses suffered by defrauded shareholders by a signifi-
cant margin.87 Fraudulent financial reporting impairs economic
decision making of nonshareholders in three ways. 
First, fraudulent disclosures are made publicly, not only to pre-
sent and future shareholders. Creditors have long relied on financial
statements to price credit, but employees and suppliers, too, rely on
financial disclosures to assess the viability of the firm and the risk
of failure, and thus their expected payoff from explicit and implicit
contracts with the firm. Moreover, to avoid detection, managers’
other statements and business choices must be consistent with
reported, but fraudulent, financial results. Many of those state-
compensation. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 951, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899-1900 (2010)
(to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n).
84. See Buell, supra note 36, at 541-44 (describing the various meanings of “securities
fraud”).
85. Financial misrepresentations come in many shapes and sizes. Some require a
restatement of previously released financial statements, others do not. Not all restatements
suggest fraud, though 80 percent of restatements between 1997 and 2002 were negative.
Kedia & Philippon, supra note 57, at 2178. Not all accounting frauds are followed by a
restatement. See Alexander Dyck et al., How Pervasive Is Corporate Fraud? 32-33 (Aug. 2011)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/adair.morse/research/
papers/pervasiveness_aug2011.pdf (estimating that 38 percent of caught frauds do not require
a restatement, such as disclosures of half-truths or misleading forward-looking information).
Even when a restatement would have been required, some firms do not survive long enough
to file a restatement (Enron, for example), some ignore the SEC’s instruction to file a
restatement, and some take a one-time accounting charge in lieu of filing a restatement. See
Jonathan M. Karpoff et al., The Cost to Firms of Cooking the Books, 43 J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 581, 585 & n.9 (2008).
86. See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 54, at 28 fig.26. 
87. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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ments are communicated to nonshareholders with the intention to
influence their behavior. 
Second, and relatedly, there is evidence that fraudulent managers
increase investment and hiring, and change pricing during periods
of fraudulent reporting.88 This interferes with economic learning by
rivals and thus distorts real economic decisions that misreporting
firms and their honest peers make. Their increased hiring and in-
vestment were premised on fraud. This fact increases the marginal
risk that the industry will shrink if the misrepresentation is
unmasked. 
Third, if fraud is discovered, the aftermath—investigations, liti-
gation, and enforcement actions—is usually very costly for firms and
their constituents. Less well known is the fact that rivals, too, suffer
losses in the aftermath. Shareholders do not internalize all those
losses, and there is evidence that both fraudulent firms and their
rivals shift some of the losses to their employees, creditors, and the
government as insurer of last resort.89
This Part begins with an overview of why managers misrepresent
their firm’s financial performance, how misrepresentations distort
economic decision making, and how frequently accounting fraud
occurs.
A. The Anatomy of a Misrepresentation
A rational manager might commit or conceal fraud when he
believes that his personal benefit exceeds the impact he would suffer
if fraud were unmasked, discounted by the likelihood of detection.90
The most common reason that managers release false disclosures
appears to be their desire to disguise disappointing performance.91
88. This is the mirror image of the argument that fraud misdirects capital and labor from
honest firms to fraudulent firms. The effect is the same, but it is useful to reframe how the
decision is made. At the level of the overall economy, fraudulent financial reporting
misallocates capital and labor among firms, producing social deadweight losses.
89. A reduced tax base and payments for unemployment insurance are a large source of
the cost of fraud to the government.
90. See Arlen & Carney, supra note 70, at 702-03.
91. See id. at 701-02. Even in the largest frauds, managers rarely set out to commit the
fraud that ultimately results: when performance disappoints, managers usually exhaust legal
options before resorting to those that are illegal. See Patricia M. Dechow et al., Predicting
Material Accounting Misstatements, 28 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 17, 19 (2011). As Professor Don
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Managers face a lot of pressure to meet performance expectations:
earning performance-based compensation, avoiding termination,
increasing the odds of promotion, avoiding the downgrade in the
firm’s debt, and averting employee exodus. They know that stock
prices of firms that miss even a single earnings target decline
substantially, and fear that their jobs and reputations might be on
the line. In particular when managers wishfully think that the
shortfall is only temporary and that real performance will soon
improve, the temptation to overstate earnings might be hard to
resist.92 Concealing bad news buys the manager time.93 
In what appears to be a smaller subset of cases, managers mis-
report their company’s performance because of greed: the structure
of managerial compensation provides supercharged incentives for
fraud. They overstate the firm’s financials to inflate the stock price,
exercise their stock options, and pocket millions of dollars.94 
Langevoort and others have suggested, managers usually begin by manipulating just a little,
perhaps to cover a temporary blip in performance, and hope that they can smooth over the
manipulation in the next period. When the next period fails to bring good news, the slippery
slope leads managers to ever greater manipulation. See Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the
Corporate Thermostat: Lessons from the Recent Financial Scandals About Self-Deception,
Deceiving Others and the Design of Internal Controls, 93 GEO. L.J. 285, 308 (2004); see also
Michael D. Guttentag, Stumbling into Crime: Stochastic Process Models of Accounting Fraud,
in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CRIMINAL LAW 204, 217-18 (Alon Harel &
Keith N. Hylton eds., 2012).
92. Arlen & Carney, supra note 70, at 702-03 (identifying the “last period” problem as an
important cause of accounting fraud); Dechow et al., supra note 91, at 19-20 (finding that
alleged fraudulent firms had strong performance before the misrepresentation, and that true
performance declined during periods of fraud). In addition, accounting principles are
sufficiently flexible to allow a manager to rationalize the fraud as merely aggressive
accounting undertaken in the interest of increasing shareholder wealth. See, e.g., David A.
Westbrook, Corporation Law After Enron: The Possibility of a Capitalist Reimagination, 92
GEO. L.J. 61, 74 (2003) (explaining the lack of clarity provided by the Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles).
93. Arlen & Carney, supra note 70, at 703; William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The
Political Economy of Fraud on the Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 106 (2011).
94. See A.C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class Actions with
Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925, 932-34 (1999) (arguing that
greed can induce managers to commit accounting fraud). Don Langevoort suggested that
layers of hierarchy in large organizations naturally produce falsely optimistic or self-serving
information because employees at every level have an incentive to embellish or rationalize.
See Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations
Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 107
(1997).
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Whatever the reason for the misrepresentation, all frauds are
alike: managers release misleading information about the firm’s
financial performance. The statement is usually accompanied by
similarly misleading public pronouncements.95 To avoid detection,
communications with the investment community as well as the
firm’s stakeholders must match the fraudulent financial disclosure.
To the extent they are observable, managers must change the firm’s
real actions to conform to its reported financial health.96 Managers
might sell output at a loss, announce new projects, overinvest in
fixed assets, and overhire.97 To better mask fraud, managers might
choose projects with higher cash-flow volatility—“lottery tickets”—
or projects whose returns are not correlated with existing invest-
ments.98 They lie to their accountants99 and even pay taxes on non-
existent earnings.100 
Unless and until fraud is discovered, the inflated stock price
benefits managers as well as the firm’s current shareholders.101 The
fraudulent firm can make cheap stock-for-stock acquisitions using
95. See Stephen P. Baginski et al., To Tell the Truth: Management Forecasts in Periods
of Accounting Fraud 3 (July 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://jindal.
utdallas.edu/som/files/BMST_Fraud-McGuire_UTD_Presentation.pdf (finding that managers
issue pessimistic forecasts during periods of accounting fraud and manipulate the firm’s
earnings to meet or beat them). Professor Wang suggests that the reason for releasing
pessimistic forecasts is that failing to meet performance expectations increases the probability
that fraud will be detected because disappointed investors might begin an external
investigation. Tracy Yue Wang, Corporate Securities Fraud: Insights from a New Empirical
Framework, J.L. ECON. & ORG. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 11), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=561425.
96. See Sadka, supra note 8, at 447 (observing that managers will change their business
decisions to conceal fraud, but only if fraud itself is punished).
97. See id. at 439, 457-58.
98. See Wang, supra note 68 (manuscript at 15). 
99. See, e.g., BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM: THE
AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON 128, 157-58 (2003) (describing examples of
deals where Enron executives misrepresented facts to its accountant, Arthur Andersen).
100. See Merle Erickson et al., How Much Will Firms Pay for Earnings that Do Not Exist?
Evidence of Taxes Paid on Allegedly Fraudulent Earnings, 79 ACCT. REV. 387, 389-90 (2004)
(reporting that out of twenty-seven firms subject to SEC enforcement actions during the
studied period, fifteen paid taxes on overstated earnings; the total amount of taxes paid
represented 2.4 percent of the firms’ market value and 20 percent of the pretax value of
overstated earnings).
101. See Westbrook, supra note 92, at 97-100, 105 (observing that managers and share-
holders have an interest in earnings management and high stock prices, but that that interest
conflicts with the public interest of accurate pricing).
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its overpriced equity, negotiate better loan terms as a result of its
perceived lower risk, and hire more talented workers, excited about
the firm’s bright future.102 The beneficiaries also include those who
sell the firm’s stock and debt in the secondary markets during
fraud.103
A misrepresentation communicates to those who contract with
the firm that the firm’s financial health is better than it really is,
that the firm poses a low credit risk, and that it is less likely to
terminate employees for business reasons. Fraudulent disclosures
also interfere with other firms’ ability to understand the markets in
which they operate. Firms’ managers and directors do not know ex
ante which business strategy is optimal and so they look to their
rivals as gauges of what the market wants. Significant misreporting
impairs rivals’ ability to discern the value of new investments and
may lead an entire industry to adopt a misguided business strat-
egy.104
There is evidence that earnings manipulation is very common,
and that many frauds are never detected.105 Estimated detection
rates vary from a high of 100 percent106 to a low of 2.39 percent.107
In a recent study that uses three different methods to estimate the
prevalence of fraud, Professors Alexander Dyck, Adair Morse, and
Luigi Zingales suggested that only about 25 percent of significant
102. See Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 451 (7th Cir. 1982).
103. For example, Enron’s Lou Pai left the firm early in 2001 with $250 million in Enron
stock and stock options. As a result of a divorce settlement, he sold his holdings in May and
June 2001, a mere six months before Enron filed for bankruptcy. MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra
note 99, at 334.
104. Abigail Brown & Simon D. Angus, Destroying Creative Destruction: The Social
Welfare Cost of Fraud 5-6 (Oct. 13, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://
abigailbrown.files.wordpress.com/2009/08/non-anon1.pdf. See generally Richard R. Nelson &
Sidney G. Winter, Evolutionary Theorizing in Economics, 16 J. ECON. PERSP. 23 (2002)
(explaining evolutionary economics and comparing it with neoclassical assumptions).
105. Joseph Gerakos & Andrei Kovrijnykh, Reporting Bias and Economic Shocks 4 (Univ.
of Chi. Booth Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. 10-12, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1546478 (finding that, on average, 17-20 percent of firms with sufficient data on
COMPUSTAT exhibit significant earnings manipulation).
106. Langevoort, supra note 94, at 106 (voicing the popular belief that all fraud is
ultimately caught).
107. See Artur Filipe Ewald Wuerges & Jose Alonso Borba, Accounting Fraud Detection:
Is It Possible to Quantify Undiscovered Cases? 1 (Dec. 1, 2010) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1718652.
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frauds are ever caught.108 They found that, in any given year, 1.3
percent of firms that are ultimately caught begin misreporting, and
3.2 percent have ongoing fraud.109 Extrapolating from evidence they
collected, the authors estimated that, at any given time, between
11.2 and 13.2 percent of firms are manipulating their earnings.110 
B. If and After the Truth Is Revealed 
Empirical studies suggest that exposing fraudulent financial
reporting is very costly for firms. About one-third of the firms that
are targets of SEC enforcement actions for misreporting file for
bankruptcy.111 Because many firms that cook their books are
financially stressed beforehand, it is likely that in many cases,
fraud merely delays bankruptcy that was inevitable.112 Delayed
bankruptcy is not necessarily a boon to nonshareholder constitu-
ents. During fraud, a firm’s performance might deteriorate beyond
repair, while managers’ costly efforts to avoid detection make things
worse.113 In addition, a reasonable number of fraudulent firms that
file for bankruptcy would have avoided failure in the absence of
108. Dyck et al., supra note 85, at 11.
109. Id. at 10. The passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act significantly reduced the number of
detected frauds, from a high in 2001 when 5.3 percent of firms were committing fraud, to a
post-SOX low of 1.3 percent in 2004. Id. at 9-10.
110. Id. at 5.
111. See BEASLEY ET AL., supra note 54, at 40 & tbl.28 (reporting that 28 percent of the
firms subject to an enforcement action between 1998 and 2007 filed for bankruptcy within two
years); Karpoff et al., supra note 85, at 593 (reporting that 34 percent of firms subject to an
SEC or Department of Justice enforcement action between 1978 and 2002 filed for
bankruptcy). 
112. See BEASLEY ET AL., supra note 54, at 11 (reporting that the median net income of a
fraudulent firm was a mere $875,000, while the 25th percentile firms faced net losses of $2.1
million).
113. Not all fraud-induced bankruptcies result in liquidation. Rather, the business
reorganizes, mitigating the harm of bankruptcy to the stakeholders (as well as the
shareholders, who often receive an equity slice in the reorganized firm). See UCLA-LOPUCKI
BANKRUPTCY RESEARCH DATABASE, http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/spreadsheet.htm (last visited
Mar. 26, 2013) (suggesting that most fraud-induced bankruptcies resulted with a confirmed
Chapter 11 plan of reorganization). The presence of a confirmed Chapter 11 plan, however,
overstates the number of fraudulent firms that survive bankruptcy. Enron emerged with a
confirmed Chapter 11 plan, but the sole purpose of the surviving entity, Enron Creditors
Recovery Corp., is to liquidate Enron’s assets for the benefit of its creditors. See About ECRC,
ENRON CREDITORS RECOVERY CORP., http://www.enron.com/index_option_com_content_task_
section_id_1_itemid_2.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2013).
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fraud or, alternately, would have filed for bankruptcy protection
earlier, before things deteriorated beyond repair. A number of
studies have found that a substantial percentage of firms, if not the
majority, were financially healthy in the period before the financial
manipulation.114
Estimating how many bankruptcies that accounting fraud causes
is difficult, but empirical evidence suggests that the number might
be relatively high. Professors Karpoff, Martin, and Lee have found
that being caught for accounting fraud is very costly for firms.115
Having studied all cases of financial misreporting that were subject
to SEC and DOJ enforcement actions between 1978 and 2002, they
found that for every dollar in increased market value due to fraud-
ulent disclosure, the firm lost that dollar after unmasking of fraud
and an additional $3.08 ($3.83 for firms that did not file for
bankruptcy).116 Of that additional loss, only 36 cents—or 8.8 percent
—was due to expected legal penalties, while the remaining $2.71
accounted for what they called lost “reputation.”117 Some part of the
reputational loss reflects the cost of conducting an internal investi-
gation, defending the firm in litigation, and suffering the collateral
consequences of enforcement actions, such as the loss of government
contracts.118 Another part reflects the “exodus of current customers
and employees,” the firm’s expected lower sales,119 and the higher
cost of contracting and financing.120 
114. A 2010 study prepared by the Treadway Commission reported that one-quarter of the
firms subject to an SEC enforcement action for financial manipulation between 1998 and 2007
reported net income of over $18 million in the quarter before they began manipulating their
earnings, while the highest net income firm in the sample reported almost $8.9 billion.
BEASLEY ET AL., supra note 54, at 11 & tbl.1. Another study found that 25 percent of bankrupt
companies with revenues over $1 billion were subject to an SEC enforcement action. DELOITTE
FORENSIC CTR., TEN THINGS ABOUT BANKRUTPCY AND FRAUD: A REVIEW OF BANKRUPTCY
FILINGS § 9 (2008), available at http://www.bankruptcyfraud.typepad.com/Deloitte_Report.pdf.
115. See Karpoff et al., supra note 85, at 581.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See Jennifer Arlen, Corporate Criminal Liability: Theory and Evidence, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 91, at 144, 150-61; Baer, supra
note 55, at 1062 (observing that securities fraud may result in delisting or losing government
contracts).
119. Baer, supra note 55, at 1062. 
120. See Sudheer Chava et al., Why Won’t You Forgive Me? The Dynamics of Borrower
Reputation Following Financial Reporting 3 (Feb. 27, 2012) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2012691 (finding that firms that released fraudulent
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Professors Dyck, Morse, and Zingales looked instead at the reduc-
tion in the value of the enterprise, measured by sales and assets.
After adjusting for the fact that firms commit fraud to hide bad
news, they found that accounting fraud destroys about 40 percent
of firm value.121 In addition, disclosing fraud usually produces a
sudden and significant shock to the firm, and the very suddenness
is costly by itself.122 
Even those fraudulent firms that avoid bankruptcy often suffer
other significant consequences: many delist—47 percent compared
with 20 percent for nonfraud firms over a ten-year period—and are
twice as likely as their honest peers to engage in material asset
sales—62 percent versus 31 percent.123 
Undiscovered financial statement fraud and its cost are largely
invisible. We do not know whether undiscovered frauds are similar
to discovered frauds or different in important respects, including
their duration. It is possible that hidden earnings manipulation
averts or delays some bankruptcies by diverting capital and labor to
fraudulent firms. But honest firms from which resources have been
diverted cannot go ahead with worthwhile projects. In addition,
actions that managers take to conceal fraud are costly in and of
themselves and often very risky. It thus seems highly unlikely that
undetected accounting fraud would, on net, benefit employees or
creditors.124 There is no doubt that hidden fraud harms rivals, who
adopt misguided strategies and invest in low-return projects based
on projections informed by accounting misrepresentations of their
peers. 
financial statements pay more for credit for at least six years after fraud is unmasked).
121. Dyck et al., supra note 85, at 5.
122. As one commentator observed, Enron, seventh on the 2001 Fortune 500 list by
revenues, melted down “abruptly, essentially without warning.” JOEL SELIGMAN, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 728 (3d ed. 2003). 
123. BEASLEY ET AL., supra note 54, at 40 & tbl.28.
124. Experimental studies suggest that fraud increases the cost of capital for honest firms,
causing them to forgo profitable new projects or abandon current ones. Oren Bar-Gill &
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Misreporting Corporate Performance 24 (Harv. Law Sch., John M. Olin
Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 400, 2002), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/abstract _id=354141.
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III. FINANCIAL MISREPRESENTATIONS AND INTRAFIRM COST
The nexus of contracts theory, which has been fantastically
influential in shaping U.S. corporate law and securities regulation,
assumes that the firm is a team of inputs organized under a net of
related contractual arrangements.125 The contracts require the firm
to pay claimants fixed amounts, except for shareholders, whose
claims are variable and depend on the residual value of the enter-
prise: the firm’s profits.126 The value of an investment in stock
depends entirely on the estimates of profits the firm might generate
in the future. Insiders, usually managers, can manipulate these
estimates by releasing false but credible information. Fraudulent
disclosures inflate the stock price, while eventual exposure of fraud
returns the price to the correct level reflecting fundamentals, which
is what the price would have been absent fraud.127 Sellers win,
buyers lose, and those who hold on are unaffected by fraud.128 
The neoclassical theory posits that fixed claimants are unaffected
by false disclosures and securities fraud because their claims are, by
definition, fixed by contract.129 The conclusion is premised on four
assumptions. First, the claims of nonshareholders are independent
and well defined.130 Second and relatedly, fixed claimants who make
125. See, e.g., Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and
Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 794 (1972); Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure,
3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 305 (1976) (integrating “elements from the theory of agency, the theory
of property rights and the theory of finance to develop a theory of the ownership structure of
the firm”).
126. See Macey, supra note 73, at 180.
127. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 59, at 635.
128. THAKOR, supra note 80, at 9 (suggesting that investors who held stock in the
fraudulent firm during the fraud period were “undamaged” by the fraud). Relying on work by
Jonathan Karpoff, Professor Arlen has made the point that shareholders in the fraudulent
firm who did not trade during the fraud are not indifferent to accounting fraud. They are
worse off than they would be absent fraud, and often much worse off, even if the firm never
pays damages or fines. Even if fraud-tainted sales offset fraud-tainted purchases ex post, and
shareholders have bought shares at a discount reflecting the systemic risk of securities fraud,
shareholders would nonetheless prefer that fewer firms commit fraud. See Arlen, supra note
118, at 150-51. 
129. See Fisch, supra note 27, at 658 (describing the neoclassical line of reasoning but
pointing out that it rests on several contestable assumptions).
130. See Amir N. Licht, The Maximands of Corporate Governance: A Theory of Values and
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firm-specific investments are compensated fully for those invest-
ments. Third, switching is frictionless and costless. And fourth, as-
sociation with the fraudulent firm has no reputational effect on
payoffs from future contracts.
The following Sections explain why and to what extent these
assumptions hold true for two groups of fixed claimants: creditors
and employees.
A. Intrafirm Cost: Theory
1. Creditors
Declining value of collateral is the primary risk for secured
lenders and is often uncorrelated with the debtor’s business pros-
pects.131 Unsecured lenders, on the other hand, face two risks
correlated with the debtor’s performance: (1) that business will
deteriorate, and (2) that the debtor will incur additional debt.132
Banks and financial institutions use contracts to mitigate the risk
of default. They demand a higher interest rate when the risk of
business failure is higher, but the rate alone does not prevent the
debtor from borrowing more afterwards.133 Banks include loan
covenants in the contract—for example, a leverage ratio ceiling—
that allow the banks to declare default and demand immediate
repayment if a covenant is violated.134 To facilitate the exercise of
their contractual rights, banks require the debtor firm to supply its
financial statements periodically and to notify the bank of any
Cognitive Style, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 649, 652 (2004).
131. Some collateral is more vulnerable than other. The value of accounts receivable, for
example, is correlated with a firm’s business prospects, while the value of its equipment may
be less so. See ERIC PRZYBYLINSKI & GREGORY J. LEONBERGER, MARQUETTE ASSOCS., SENIOR
SECURED LOANS POSITION PAPER 2 (2011), available at http://www.marquetteassociates.com/
portals/0/marquette_senior_secured_loans.pdf.
132. See COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY ADM’R OF NAT’L BANKS, LOAN PORTFOLIO
MANAGEMENT 3-11 (1998), available at http://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-
type/comptrollers-handbook/lpm.pdf (discussing risks of lending).
133. Leveraged buyouts are an example of opportunistic borrowing. During the buyout, the
firm borrows a massive amount of debt at a high interest rate but does not eliminate its prior
debt that was priced for a firm that was much less risky.
134. See Rosemary Peavler, Restrictive Bank Loan Covenants for Small Businesses,
ABOUT.COM BUS. FIN., http://bizfinance.about.com/od/businessloans/qt/restrictive-bank-loan-
covenants-small-businesses.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2013).
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covenant violations.135 If the debtor fails to do so, or if it misrepre-
sents its financial position at the time of borrowing, it is liable to the
bank for its failure. Like equity investors, banks diversify their
firm-specific risk by lending to many different borrowers and by
syndicating large loans.136 They remain exposed to market risk of
fraud, but demand a fraud premium as ex ante compensation.
Institutional creditors fit well with the nexus theory of fixed
claimants.137 However, credit risk is relevant in agreements other
than the traditional bank loan. Trade creditors—suppliers and
vendors—are exposed to the risk of default. Unlike banks and
institutional lenders, trade creditors do not specialize in managing
credit risk. They also cannot eliminate the risk of fraud as effec-
tively as banks through diversification: they are exposed to the ups
and downs of their industry. Finally, there are few economies of
scale in monitoring counterparty credit risk. It is almost as costly
for a supplier holding a $100,000 account receivable to monitor the
buyer as it is for a lender with a $10 million loan. 
Instead of detailed contracts, trade creditors reduce the risk by
relying more heavily on exit. If possible, they diversify their cus-
tomer base. They deliver supplies in batches, requiring payment
periodically and frequently. If the buyer does not pay, a supplier will
stop supplying the materials. A misrepresentation of the firm’s per-
formance impedes accurate assessment of the firm’s credit worthi-
ness and its liquidation value.138 But the amount at risk is relatively
small, assuming that a supplier can easily and cheaply replace lost
business from the fraudulent firm. A supplier’s exposure and thus
the cost are greater when it has made a substantial firm-specific
investment. In those industries, we should expect vertical integra-
tion as a rational response.139
135. See Beginners’ Guide to Financial Statements, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/begfinstmtguide.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2013) (describing
financial statements).
136. See PRZYBYLINSKI & LEONBERGER, supra note 131, at 2.
137. But, as Professor Coffee has noted, there are many ways for managers to increase risk
that real-life contracts cannot control. Coffee, supra note 13, at 69.
138. See Dragon Yongjun Tang et al., Creditors’ Expected Recovery and Internal Control
Quality: Evidence from Credit Default Swaps 1 (Mar. 2012) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2023112/. 
139. See Benjamin Klein, Fisher-General Motors and the Nature of the Firm, 43 J.L. &
ECON. 105, 105 (2000).
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2. Employees 
Valuation methods for financial investments are equally useful
to assess the value of employees’ human capital investment. The
value of human capital is then the net present value of future
income streams from work. In a perfectly competitive labor market,
where employees have made no firm-specific investments, salaries
across firms are driven to their competitive floor. If employees can
switch jobs quickly and at no cost, if none of their pay has been
deferred, if working for a fraudulent firm does not impair their
earning potential, and if the existence of misreporting has no impact
on overall economic growth and employment levels, employees are
indifferent to securities fraud in any firm: the value of their human
capital is unaffected. 
But all these assumptions must be relaxed, and that has a pro-
found impact on the cost of financial misreporting to employees.
First, employees are often their employer’s creditors because they
are promised contingent or deferred compensation. Contingent com-
pensation, such as a year-end bonus, is usually conditioned on the
employee’s own and the firm’s performance. When the firm does
poorly, it might pay no bonuses, even to its most productive em-
ployees. Deferred compensation, such as a company pension or
severance, is at risk if the firm performs poorly. Employees thus
require accurate information about their employer’s prospects to
price the risk and decide when it is efficient to find a new job.
Second, many jobs require employees to develop firm-specific
skills, including good working relationships with coworkers, that are
lost if the employee is terminated.140 Evidence reproduced below
suggests that discovered fraud shrinks employment relative to
honest financial disclosure.141
Third, labor is comparatively much more specialized than capital
and less liquid. Specialized, or nonhomogenous, markets have fewer
140. See Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the
Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297, 302-03 (1978) (promoting vertical
integration of human capital). Employees who develop firm-specific skills are usually paid a
quasi rent for making the investment, but the payment is deferred and paid either as a higher
salary or as severance.
141. Unmasking fraud and subsequent litigation are costly, and firms pass on the cost to
employees.
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buyers, and so it necessarily takes an employee longer to find
acceptable substitute employment than it takes a shareholder to
cash out.142 Quick terminations that usually follow revelations of
accounting fraud lead to periods of unemployment or force employ-
ees into accepting lower-paying jobs—costs employees could have
avoided if they had warning of the firm’s declining business pros-
pects. The cost of exit increases if employees have made personal
decisions in reliance on retaining the job, like buying a house.143 
Accounting fraud also harms employees’ reputations, and not just
those of fraudsters. At least anecdotally, even innocent employees
of Enron and Arthur Andersen, Enron’s auditor, reported being
“mocked, criticized, and not trusted,” in addition to being unem-
ployed.144
Finally, and most importantly, employees cannot diversify away
the firm-specific risk of failure or fraud. For most workers, human
capital constitutes a large percentage of their wealth, so the loss is
substantial, even if the displacement is only temporary.145 
There is little reason to believe that workers can use contracts to
effectively protect against firm failure and/or fraud, for structural
and informational reasons.146 Employers do not know whether the
employee is likely to be productive at the time of hiring.147 They
rationally screen for “difficult” employees, including those who
might try to negotiate too hard. Except for top executive employ-
ment contracts—and perhaps a few thousand tech guys in the
142. Kent Greenfield, The Unjustified Absence of Federal Fraud Protection in the Labor
Market, 107 YALE L.J. 715, 749 (1997) (noting that the “exit option” for workers is much more
costly than it is for capital). Charles Schwab charges individual investors $8.95 for online
trades. Fees & Commissions, CHARLES SCHWAB, http://www.schwab-global.com/public/schwab-
gcb-en/what_we_offer/independent_investing/fees_and_commissions.html (last visited Mar.
26, 2013).
143. See Greenfield, supra note 142, at 719 (noting that companies seek such reliance).
144. Emuna Braverman, Enron’s Collateral Damage, AISH.COM (Nov. 16, 2002),
http://www.aish.com/ci/be/48881897.html.
145. Daniel R. Fischel, Labor Markets and Labor Law Compared with Capital Markets and
Corporate Law, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1061, 1067-68 (1984).
146. But see Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization
Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423, 1443-44 (1993) (suggesting
that employees can protect their interests either contractually or through regulatory
pressure).
147. Interviews continue to be used in hiring, although they are poor predictors of
subsequent employee performance.
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Silicon Valley—there is little evidence that individual employees
could negotiate contractual provisions other than perhaps pay. 
Even if negotiation were more likely, informational asymmetries
abound. It is nearly impossible for employees to verify at the time
of hiring if the firm’s managers are honest. In addition, at-will
employment is entrenched in the American labor market, but most
employees and employers act as if employment is long term.148 But
because the term of employment is open, employees have no redress
for termination and cannot insure against it.149 Accurate informa-
tion about the expected payoff is crucial to decide when and whether
to seek alternative employment. Fraud artificially reduces the dis-
count rate and leads employees to overstate the value of continued
employment with that firm. Collective bargaining could mitigate
contracting problems, but unions “are in a period of historical
weakness.”150 
Instead, employees rely on exit. Accurate and timely information
about the firm’s performance and viability is crucial to assessing
whether the expected risk-adjusted revenue stream from their
current employer, minus the cost of exit, exceeds the opportunity
cost, and whether and when the employee should start looking for
a new job. Employees certainly rely on internal sources of informa-
tion, including rumors and office gossip, to assess the firm’s likely
future performance, but anecdotal evidence suggests that they also
rely on the firm’s securities disclosures and the stock price itself.151
The larger the firm, the less complete and reliable are the internal
sources of information—perhaps with the exception of the firm’s top
management and its internal audit group. Consequently, the firm’s
securities disclosures and communications by top management
148. Median employee tenure with a current employer in 2010 was 4.4 years. News
Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Employee Tenure in 2010 (Sept. 14,
2010), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/tenure_09142010.pdf.
149. A lawsuit for discriminatory dismissal aside, employees with at-will employment
contracts have no chance of prevailing against an employer for termination.
150. Greenfield, supra note 142, at 752. Only 6.9 percent of private sector workers were
unionized in 2010. News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Union
Members—2010, at 1 & tbl.3 (Jan. 21, 2011), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/
union2_01212011.pdf. Overall union membership has been on the decline since the Bureau
of Labor Statistics started collecting information in 1983. See id. at 2.
151. See, e.g., MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 99, at 125 (noting that employees’ elevators
at Enron constantly displayed the current stock price).
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become more useful for employees’ own assessment of their likely
returns from continued employment with the firm. 
Concealing the firm’s decline upends employees’ ability to decide
whether to quit, because fraud credibly conveys to employees that
the firm is doing better than it really is.152 Dishonest managers are
aware of the risk of flight and try to reassure their workers, just as
they reassure providers of capital: they sell the lie to mask fraud
and to prevent employee exodus.153 
When managers are caught manipulating their firm’s earnings,
the firm often unravels quickly—certainly more quickly than most
business failures—exposing employees to sudden unemployment. If
they knew the truth about the firm, employees would have looked
for work sooner and avoided joblessness. Finally, when firms shed
many employees simultaneously, that extra supply will depress
wages, at least locally.154 
One might argue, as did Professor Ball, that fraud benefits em-
ployees because it delays business failure, assuming that failure
was inevitable.155 This is a contestable assumption and appears
accurate for only a minority of firms.156 But even if it were accurate,
fraud only benefits employees if the difference between their salary
at the fraudulent firm during delay and their opportunity cost—that
is, an alternative job—exceeds the expected cost of fraud-induced
delay and the reputational harm to the employee from fraud at its
employer.157 If fraud delays bankruptcy, management might squan-
152. See, e.g., Greenfield, supra note 142, at 739-40 (explaining the relationship between
job security and pay). Of course, employees complicit in the scheme do not rely on the false
financial picture of the firm’s health.
153. See, e.g., Faith Stevelman Kahn, Bombing Markets, Subverting the Rule of Law:
Enron, Financial Fraud, and September 11, 2001, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1579, 1596 (2002) (“Lay
reassured employees about the positive financial prospects of the firm and even suggested
that they would benefit from purchasing more Enron stock.”); see also Greenfield, supra note
142, at 718-19, 721 & n.26 (recounting numerous stories of employer fraud, usually featuring
managers who reassured workers that the firm was profitable to prevent flight, even though
they planned to shut down the factory).
154. This assumes that employees cannot move costlessly, because they own their home
or have kids in local schools, and that rivals cannot expand costlessly to take over laid-off
workers.
155. Ball, supra note 74, at 297-98.
156. See discussion supra Part II.B.
157. For instance, assume that fraud delays bankruptcy by one year during which the
employee earns $80,000. During that time, the best alternative job would have paid $70,000.
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der more money that otherwise would have been available to pay
severance. Delay might increase the odds of liquidation over reorg-
anization and result in greater job losses overall. The job market
might deteriorate in the interim, reducing the number and the
desirability of alternative employment options, thereby increasing
the period of joblessness and expected salary.158 If the firm
“implode[s] in a wave of accounting scandals,” employees’ reputa-
tions and their earning potential may be harmed.159 
If fraud remains hidden, employees of fraudulent firms might
benefit. But hidden fraud harms employees as a class. Financial
misreporting distorts the allocation of labor among firms: it
increases the relative cost of labor for nonfraud firms, just as it
increases their cost of capital and, on the margin, reduces hiring.160
Fraud in the secondary market for securities misallocates shares
among traders161 but does not misallocate capital between firms and
does not distort funding for new projects.162 In contrast, the market
for labor is a primary market. Fraud misallocates labor from a
“higher-value use to a lower-value use [and thus] inflicts [a] dead-
weight loss on society in every case.”163 Overall, fewer workers are
hired than would be in a world without accounting fraud, even
though undetected fraud might benefit some workers.164 Those who
work can demand a fraud premium, but because human capital
When fraud is revealed, the employee loses her job, is unemployed for six months, finds
another job that pays $60,000 in another state, and incurs $10,000 in moving expenses.
Without fraud, the employee would have been fired at the beginning of the year and taken the
$70,000 job after six months of unemployment. In sum, the employee benefits $10,000 during
fraud, but loses $15,000 after it is unmasked, a net loss of $5,000 compared with the no-fraud
scenario.
158. Accounting fraud is procyclical: it is more common during investment bubbles. See
Tracy Yue Wang & Andrew Winton, Competition and Corporate Fraud Waves 21-22 (Apr.
2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1783752.
159. Letter from Sherron Watkins, Vice President of Corporate Dev. of Enron Corp., to
Kenneth Lay, Chief Exec. Officer of Enron Corp. (Aug. 14, 2001), available at http://news.
findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/empltr2lay82001.pdf.
160. See Greenfield, supra note 142, at 743 (“[T]he cost of labor for the economy as a whole
would rise because workers would have to be compensated for being subject to fraud by their
employers.”).
161. See id. at 730 & n.67, 731.
162. That is, assuming no new debt or primary equity offerings.
163. Greenfield, supra note 142, at 749.
164. See, e.g., id. at 748-49.
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cannot be diversified, those unable to find paid work are not
compensated.
As a result, accounting fraud is costly for employees, who cannot
reduce that risk through diversification. The discussion about the
implications of financial misrepresentations on employees applies
equally to suppliers, vendors, and customers that make firm-specific
investments or operate in markets where changing contractual
partners is particularly costly. Suppliers, vendors, or customers that
are organized as firms might pass on the cost to their investors and
employees, and perhaps down the chain—producing second- and
third-order effects of financial misrepresentations.165
3. Do Nonshareholders Care About Financial Disclosures? 
One might argue that employees, for example, do not read and
rely on financial disclosures. Even if they did, a public firm’s
disclosures are directed at the shareholders, not employees, so
employee reliance is irrelevant. This Article offers four related
responses. 
First, the business community and some academic commentators
seem to believe that public disclosures “are increasingly useless as
sources of information.”166 There is no empirical evidence that this
is in fact true. Public disclosures, and in particular audited financial
statements, are generally perceived as cheap to find, comprehensive,
and reliable because they are audited and certified, and carry a
nontrivial risk of liability if found to be false.167 
But even if audited financial statements were indeed irrelevant
to investors, that fact would say little about whether they are rele-
vant to a firm’s employees, for example. Many employees have
access to private information about their employers, but the infor-
mation is often incomplete and unverified. The larger, more com-
165. Welfare economics recognizes the existence of second- and third-order effects as firms
pass on the cost to their counterparties, workers, and customers, as customers cut back on or
shift to cheaper substitutes. See generally HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS:
A MODERN APPROACH 634-39 (8th ed. 2009) (offering an overview of social welfare functions,
welfare maximization, and individualistic social welfare functions).
166. Jonathan Macey, Deconstructing the Galleon Insider Trading Case, WALL ST. J., Apr.
19, 2011, at A17.
167. See Sadka, supra note 8, at 447 (discussing economic consequences of accounting fraud
and noting that “enforcement makes financial statements credible”). 
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plex, and more diversified the firm, the less useful is employees’
private information about their employer. It is rational for employ-
ees to rely on publicly disclosed information unless they believe
their private information is more accurate—for example, when they
are involved in or aware of the fraudulent scheme.168 Most public
firms are sufficiently large that the vast majority of their employees
really do not have access to the sort of internal information that
would flag fraud.169 
Second, fraud begets more fraud. When a firm releases a false
financial statement, its voluntary disclosures and its observable
actions must be consistent with the false statement, or else fraud
will be discovered.170 Mass layoffs at a time that a firm is reporting
exponentially growing revenues are suspicious, at the least. 
Firms’ managers recognize that employees read publicly disclosed
information about the firm. For example, the auditor of Groupon, an
online daily deal vendor, recently identified material weaknesses in
the firm’s internal controls, which usually signal more serious
problems.171 Shortly after the disclosure, Groupon’s CEO Andrew
Mason addressed the firm’s 11,000 employees in a town hall
meeting to reassure them that the firm was taking steps to fix the
problem.172 Surely, the rank-and-file employees were not only con-
cerned about the value of their Groupon stock but also about their
jobs. 
168. The Arthur Andersen example, which is often used to argue against corporate criminal
liability, is useful to illustrate the point. Most of the auditors working for Arthur Andersen
had no idea that their firm was involved in the Enron fraud, yet all lost their jobs when the
firm was indicted. See Elizabeth K. Ainslie, Indicting Corporations Revisited: Lessons of the
Arthur Andersen Prosecution, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 107, 107-09 (2006); cf. Stephen Morris &
Hyun Song Shin, Social Value of Public Information, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 1521, 1522 (2002)
(explaining that it is rational for individuals to rely on public information when it is more
reliable, but that overreliance on public information in the presence of precise private
information reduces social welfare). 
169. See generally Morris & Shin, supra note 168, at 1524-33 (providing a mathematically
theoretical analysis on the interplay between public and private information and social
welfare).
170. Audited financial reporting and voluntary disclosure of managers’ private information
are complements and reinforce each other. See Ray Ball et al., Audited Financial Reporting
and Voluntary Disclosure as Complements: A Test of the Confirmation Hypothesis, 53 J. ACCT.
& ECON. 136, 136-37 (2012).
171. See Shira Ovide, Groupon Must Avoid Taking “Stupid Risks,” CEO Says, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 26, 2012, at B1. 
172. See id.
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Third, it is true that investors, creditors, and employees care
about different information about the firm. Any information that
moves the stock price is arguably relevant to investors. Banks and
institutional creditors care about the risk of default and the
liquidation value of their claims, but are largely indifferent to firm
performance above a certain threshold.173 Institutional creditors, for
example, are very sensitive to a firm’s systemic weaknesses in in-
ternal controls that affect the firm’s overall control environment and
financial reporting process, because they signal uncertainty about
the firm’s creditworthiness and liquidation value.174 Creditors are
substantially less concerned about improper accounting of individ-
ual transactions.175 
On the other hand, most employees, suppliers, and vendors have
open-term contracts with the firm. As a result, they are sensitive to
specific information that makes contract termination more likely,
such as declining sales or revenues of particular divisions and
mounting debt burden, but they also care about general risk that
the firm will lay off people on a large scale and shrink production.176
As a result, at-will employees are quite sensitive to information
about the performance of the firm and its divisions, as well as the
firm’s debt burden.
And finally, one might contend that firms disclose their financial
information to investors, and thus other market participants have
no right to rely on it: their reliance is not justifiable in a legal
sense.177 That may be, but that is only an argument against private
causes of action by employees, not against taking the total cost of
financial statement fraud into account in public regulation and
enforcement. Once relevant information is publicly disclosed, mar-
ket participants will use it and rely on it. Moreover, it enhances
social welfare when market participants rely on accurate disclosures
173. See Tang et al., supra note 138, at 24-28.
174. See id.
175. See id.
176. When faced with high debt payments, firms will cut costs by terminating employees
before defaulting on a loan. See, e.g., Sam Dolnick, Finances Plague Company Running
Halfway Houses, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2012, at A1 (reporting that a private halfway-house-
operating firm maintained dangerously low staffing levels to avoid defaulting on its debt).
177. I would like to thank Professor George Geis of the University of Virginia School of Law
for raising this objection.
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and make better-informed investment decisions.178 Conversely, their
reliance on fraudulent financial disclosures reduces social welfare.179
Even if the disclosing firm’s employees have no legal right to sue for
financial misrepresentations, the harms they suffer ought to be
included in the calculation of the total harm that the false disclosure
causes.
B. Intrafirm Cost: Evidence
No doubt, financial misrepresentations harm the firm’s share-
holders. Dozens of studies report average stock price declines
ranging from 9 percent180 to a high of 38 percent.181 But as the
theoretical discussion above suggests, financial manipulation harms
the firm’s nonshareholder constituents also. Not surprisingly, the
value of the firm’s debt usually declines when fraud is revealed.182
Thus far underappreciated has been the harm to employees. 
First, a couple of caveats are in order. Many of the studies re-
ported in this Article focus on the effects of restatements issued
between 1997 and 2002. It is possible that the period is not repre-
sentative because the frequency of earnings manipulation was
relatively high. Between 1988 and 2008, on average twenty-one
firms per year faced an SEC enforcement action for securities
fraud.183 Between 1997 and 2002, the average was 53 percent
higher, or thirty-two firms per year.184 As a result, the findings re-
ported below might not be representative of accounting fraud gen-
erally. 
178. See Jeffrey Wurgler, Financial Markets and the Allocation of Capital, 58 J. FIN. ECON.
187, 207-09 (2000) (finding evidence that better-informed stock prices help managers and
investors direct resources to growing industries); see also Robert M. Bushman & Abbie J.
Smith, Financial Accounting Information and Corporate Governance, 32 J. ACCT. & ECON. 237,
304-05 (2001) (explaining that financial disclosures limit opportunities for managerial rent
seeking). 
179. See, e.g., Joseph Bower & Stuart Gilson, The Social Cost of Fraud and Bankruptcy,
HARV. BUS. REV., Dec. 2003, at 20, 22; Sadka, supra note 8, at 458. 
180. Patricia M. Dechow et al., Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation: An
Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC, 13 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 1, 27
(1996).
181. Karpoff et al., supra note 85, at 582.
182. See, e.g., Tang et al., supra note 138, at 8-9.
183. See, e.g., Goldman et al., supra note 15 (manuscript at 30 tbl.3).
184. See id.
2013] THE COST OF SECURITIES FRAUD 1927
In addition, a few of the studies discussed report effects of all
restatements, not just restatements accompanied by an enforcement
action or a lawsuit. An enforcement action is a strong signal of
fraud, but a restatement without an enforcement action does not
necessarily signal the absence of fraud. The SEC has historically
used its limited budget to target smaller frauds and “the more
obvious and spectacular cases of earnings manipulation.”185 
This warrants two further observations. First, social welfare
losses accompany even entirely innocent misstatements, but fraud-
ulent misrepresentations ought to produce greater losses.186 If a
misrepresentation is truly innocent, managers have no incentive to
engage in costly masking strategies to avoid detection. An error
might induce them to pursue an ill-informed business strategy but
will not lead to investments specifically chosen to disguise fraud. In
addition, if managers do not try to conceal errors, it is plausible that
the errors will be detected and corrected sooner than fraudulent
disclosures. Moreover, it is likely that honest managers will notice
a discrepancy that is significant, suggesting that erroneous mis-
statements should be smaller than those that are fraudulent.
Finally, if innocent errors are distributed normally, they should
cancel each other out across firms—at least to some extent—with
some overstating earnings and others understating earnings. As a
result, measuring the effects of accounting fraud by looking at all
restatements understates social welfare losses that each incident of
fraud causes, assuming that at least some restatements are entirely
innocent.187
185. Dechow et al., supra note 180, at 2.
186. Reasons include: (1) if innocent, misstatements are likely to be corrected sooner
because firms are not trying to avoid detection; (2) managers are less likely to take on highly
risky projects hoping to hide fraud.
187. Not all restatements suggest fraud, and not all accounting frauds are followed by a
restatement or an enforcement action. Using restatements alone overstates fraud, but using
enforcement actions understates it. Professor Karpoff and his collaborators report that public
enforcement actions accompany 40.2 percent of all restatements in their sample; they also
note that many firms subject to an enforcement action do not survive long enough to file a
restatement, and some simply ignore the SEC’s instruction to file a restatement. Karpoff et
al., supra note 85, at 585 & n.9.
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1. The Cost of Fraud to Employees
Few studies have attempted to study whether and how harmful
accounting fraud is to the firm’s employees and labor markets gen-
erally. Professors Kedia and Philippon estimated the real economic
costs of financial misrepresentations to labor markets by examining
a large sample of restating firms between January 1997 and June
2002, when about 10 percent of all listed firms restated their
earnings at least once.188 They found that restating firms hired and
invested more than comparable firms during periods of suspicious
accounting, reduced labor and borrowing, and sold capital assets
after the restatement.189 To maintain consistency between reported
numbers and their business operations, restating firms mimicked
firms that were growing as fast as the numbers would suggest.190
The authors showed that overinvestment would not have been
possible but for the financial misrepresentation.191 
The implications of the Kedia and Philippon study are significant.
Restating firms overhired and overinvested during the period of the
misrepresentation and reduced both labor and investment thereaf-
ter. The subsequent decline was not offset by the earlier growth—it
exceeded it and substantially exceeded the trends in the economy.
While all nonfarm payrolls increased by 6.7 percent between 1997
and 1999 and then declined by 1.5 percent from 2000 to 2002,
employment in restating firms increased by 500,000—25 percent—
and then fell by 600,000.192 
More troubling is that industries marred by restatements lost
jobs permanently, even where rivals were able to reclaim the re-
stating firms’ market shares—an expected boon for the sharehold-
ers. Instead of expanding their employment and investment to
188. See Kedia & Philippon, supra note 57, at 2172 (noting that theirs is the first article
to study the “effect of earnings management on the allocation of resources”). 
189. Id. at 2171, 2183, 2184 tbl.3 (finding that employment growth during the period of
fraudulent reporting is 4.1 percent higher than in comparable nonfraud firms, and 4.4 percent
lower in postrestatement periods; similarly with investments—4.4 percent higher during
fraud and 5.6 percent lower thereafter).
190. Id. at 2185-87 (“[T]he magnitude of the earnings management and the degree of
distortions in employment and investment are related, and ... it is unlikely that a similar
dynamic of employment and investment could happen without earnings manipulation.”).
191. Id. at 2171.
192. Id. at 2193, 2194 fig.3.
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compensate for the losses of restating firms, rivals also reported
negative employment and investment growth, coupled with strong
labor productivity growth, compared with nonrestating firms in
more honest industries.193 However, increased labor productivity
was not offset by higher wages.194 
IV. FINANCIAL MISREPRESENTATIONS AND EXTERNAL COST 
A. The Cost of Fraud to Rivals: Theory 
1. Economic Learning
Securities laws require firms to disclose specific information
about lines of business, the cost of sales, and market share, which
is useful to that firm’s present and potential rivals. Unlike a stylized
financial model where risk and expected returns of each project can
be accurately calculated in advance, real-life managers do not know
ex ante which business strategy is optimal, so they look to their
rivals as gauges of what the market wants. Other firms’ financial
disclosures and annual reports are “excellent source document[s]”
that mitigate uncertainty about industry-level demand and costs,
and help firms in the same industry make strategic decisions and
distinguish good projects from bad ones.195 They are also cheap—
certainly cheaper than industrial espionage—comprehensive, and
193. In other words, nonrestating firms increase their sales per employee—that is, claim
some of the restating firms’ market share—but do not hire any new employees. See id. at
2195, 2197.
194. See id. at 2195.
195. Durnev & Mangen, supra note 15, at 680-81 (citing Phillip Moon & Ken Bates, Core
Analysis in Strategic Performance Appraisal, 4 MGMT. ACCT. RES. 139, 140 (1993)); see
Bushman & Smith, supra note 178, at 293-94. A number of studies suggest that firms copy
more than just their peers’ business strategy. Phillip G. Berger & Rebecca Hann, Segment
Disclosures, Proprietary Costs, and the Market for Corporate Control 30 (Dec. 2002)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=357780 (finding evidence that
competitors cannot learn proprietary information about segment profitability unless it is
disclosed). Firms mimic their rivals’ restatement choices, with some industries preferring the
more transparent restatement preceded by a Form 8-K filing, and others “restating under the
radar.” See Linda A. Myers et al., Restating Under the Radar? Determinants of Restatement
Disclosure Choices and the Related Market Reactions 3-4, 21 (Sept. 2011) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1309786 (citing to a half dozen studies). 
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relatively reliable, because they are audited and certified, and carry
a nontrivial risk of liability if found to be false.196 
If the market appears to reward particular strategies reported in
financial disclosures, rivals will mimic what they perceive to be the
best performer. If a line of business appears to be profitable, other
firms might be attracted to enter the same market. While manda-
tory disclosure will reduce monopolistic profit margins and thus
harm disclosing firms, it plays an important role in technology
development, which is critical to growth.
Significant misreporting, particularly of “core accounts, such as
sales, market share, and costs,”197 impairs rivals’ ability to discern
the value of new business strategies and other market participants’
ability to understand the markets in which they operate.198 As a
result of a misrepresentation, an entire industry might overinvest,
overborrow, and overhire.199 
2. Distorted Competition
Fraudulent firms often adopt inefficient pricing or output to mask
fraud, to which their rivals respond. Unless the fraudulent firm
operates a monopoly without complements or substitutes, its pricing
or quantity decisions—distorted to correspond with fraudulent fi-
nancial reporting—distort product markets.200 Professor Gil Sadka
found that while WorldCom was misreporting its financials, it
charged low prices and increased its market share.201 Its competi-
tors, Sprint and AT&T, responded by cutting their prices and saw
196. See J. Gregory Sidak, The Failure of Good Intentions: The WorldCom Fraud and the
Collapse of American Telecommunications After Deregulation, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 207, 209-10
(2003) (arguing that because WorldCom’s reporting about the growth of its business was
subject to regulatory oversight, “it was reasonable for rival carriers to believe WorldCom’s
misrepresentation”). 
197. Durnev & Mangen, supra note 15, at 681.
198. Brown & Angus, supra note 104, at 4. See generally Nelson & Winter, supra note 104,
at 23-24 (explaining evolutionary economics and comparing it with neoclassical assumptions).
199. See Brown & Angus, supra note 104, at 4-5 (describing the process of learning and
economic growth). For example, WorldCom and the telecommunications industry significantly
overinvested in long-distance capacity and Internet-cable capacity as a result of WorldCom’s
false reports about Internet traffic. See Sidak, supra note 196, at 228-31.
200. Sadka, supra note 8, at 441, 443.
201. Id. at 455-56.
2013] THE COST OF SECURITIES FRAUD 1931
a substantial decline in their operating margins.202 Professors Bower
and Gilson estimate that if WorldCom had set prices according to its
real earnings, the industry could have generated an additional $40
billion in profit.203 Consumers might benefit from product market
distortions in the short term, but if fraud bankrupts an entire
industry, consumers are harmed in the long run, especially if the
goods are durable.204
Alternately, fraud might “work” and allow the firm to cement a
dominant position in the industry. Waste Management, a company
that “fostered a culture of fraudulent accounting,” was charged with
fraud not once, but twice.205 Yet it survived relatively unscathed and
today dominates the market for solid waste removal, often charging
monopolistic prices for its services—great for its shareholders, less
so for consumers. 
Professor Patricia Dechow and her collaborators confirmed em-
pirically that fraudulent firms generally increased their scale during
fraud.206 But the size of the increase depended on the competitive-
ness of the industry. Fraud can substantially distort noncompetitive
product markets and produce billions of dollars in deadweight
losses, as WorldCom and its impact on the telecommunications
industry demonstrate.207 In truly competitive markets where price
is set by marginal cost, managers cannot as easily expand their
firm’s market share either by lowering prices or increasing sales. If
they do, they will quickly bankrupt the firm and fraud will be
exposed.
Product market competition thus affects the size of the distortion
from fraud, but not its existence: one firm’s change in price or
202. Id. at 457.
203. Bower & Gilson, supra note 179, at 20.
204. Sadka, supra note 8, at 442 & n.4. For example, when American carmakers were near
bankruptcy during the 2008-09 financial crisis, consumers were wary of buying GM cars for
fear they would not be covered by the warranty. To allay their concerns, the federal
government guaranteed their warranty claims. See Government to Guarantee GM, Chrysler
Warranties, U.S. NEWS (Mar. 30, 2009, 11:26 AM), http://usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/
cars-trucks/daily-news/090330-Government-to-Guarantee-GM-Chrysler-Warranties.
205. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Waste Management Founder, Five Other
Former Top Officers Sued for Massive Fraud (Mar. 26, 2002), available at http://www.sec.
gov/news/headlines/wastemgmt6.htm.
206. Dechow et al., supra note 91, at 20.
207. Sadka, supra note 8, at 461 tbl.2, 463.
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output will always shift the equilibrium and affect the prices or
output of other firms’ products.208 
3. Contagion
Assuming that fraud is an idiosyncratic event, rivals should, in
theory, benefit, not lose, from its unmasking. Discovery of account-
ing fraud is costly for the firm, and so its rivals could use the
opportunity to grab that firm’s market share, which should increase
their stock price and employment.209 
On the other hand, providers of capital do not know if rivals of the
fraudulent firm are misreporting also, so they demand higher risk
premiums or sell their stock in rival firms, which depresses their
stock prices. In the accounting literature, the negative effect of
discovering accounting fraud in one firm on equity prices of rival
firms is called contagion. Two factors cause contagion: investor
concerns about rivals’ accounting quality, and the expected higher
cost for new capital.210 
In addition to contagion, unmasking of fraud discloses that the
prospects of a particular industry are less rosy than previously
believed. In response, firms in that industry reevaluate their ex-
pected returns from existing investment and reduce current
investment, thereby reducing their demand for labor and capital.
Lower expected returns are reflected in lower equity prices. 
208. Id. at 441.
209. See Tan Xu et al., Intra-Industry Effects of Earnings Restatements Due to Accounting
Irregularities, 33 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 696, 697 (2006) (“An earnings restatement could have
competitive effect because it could decrease the restating firm’s competitiveness relative to
its competitors.”); see also Larry H.P. Lang & René M. Stulz, Contagion and Competitive
Intra-Industry Effects of Bankruptcy Announcements: An Empirical Analysis, 32 J. FIN. ECON.
45, 54 (1992) (finding that bankruptcies in concentrated industries tend to be positively
correlated with rivals’ stock prices).
210. See Xu et al., supra note 209, at 698 (explaining the causes and mechanics of the
contagion effect).
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B. The Cost of Fraud to Rivals: Evidence
1. Equity Market Externalities
False disclosures affect rivals in several ways. First, after the
false disclosure is released but before its falsity is revealed, rivals
both misinvest and face a relatively higher cost of capital as
compared with the fraudulent firm. If investors are led to believe
that the industry has good prospects, the cost of capital might
decline for all industry firms, to some extent offsetting the cost of
fraud to rivals but, ceteris paribus, increasing the cost to nonin-
dustry firms. After the financial misrepresentation is corrected,
rivals face contagion. In addition, rivals reduce their investment
levels after a restatement because of changed opportunities for
external financing, both equity and debt, and because they reassess
the expected profitability of future projects.
Several studies find that a restatement, whether accompanied by
an SEC or DOJ enforcement action or not, has a negative effect on
stock prices of nonrestating firms in the same industry. Professors
Gleason, Jenkins, and Johnson, who reviewed all restatements
between 1997 and 2002, found that restating firms’ stock prices
declined on average by 19.8 percent around the announcement
date,211 and their rivals’ stock prices declined by a half percent.212
The effect on rivals of financial services firms was more pronounced:
1.5 percent.213 
Professors Durnev and Mangen looked at a similar sample and
confirmed the findings of the Gleason study. They found that both
the restating firms and their rivals experienced significantly nega-
tive abnormal returns around the announcement date—8.28 percent
and 0.34 percent respectively.214 But the aggregate loss to rivals and
their shareholders was much greater than the harm to shareholders
in the restating firm: in one case that they looked at, the restating
211. Christi A. Gleason et al., The Contagion Effects of Accounting Restatements, 83 ACCT.
REV. 83, 91 (2008). 
212. Id. at 93.
213. Id.
214. Durnev & Mangen, supra note 15, at 699.
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firm lost $141 million in market capitalization while its rivals lost
$581 million.215
Professors Goldman, Stefanescu, and Peyer’s study supplemented
these findings. Looking only at restatements accompanied by an
SEC enforcement action, the authors found that rivals’ stock prices
on average dropped by 0.54 percent around the date that fraud was
unmasked.216 Declines were more pronounced in competitive indus-
tries, while in the most concentrated industries, rivals’ stock prices
on average increased after discovery of fraud. In the aggregate,
rivals in the most competitive industries lost almost four times what
the restating firms lost: $295 billion versus $80 billion, measured by
market capitalization.217 Rivals in the most concentrated industries,
however, gained $0.69 billion, whereas the restating firms lost $39
billion.218 
The authors argued that rivals in competitive industries are less
able to capture the fraudulent firm’s market share, both because
there are many similarly situated firms vying for customers and
because firms in competitive industries are resource constrained.219
In addition, rivals in concentrated industries can use their product
market power to pass along the costs of the shock to their custom-
ers, protecting their profits and their stock prices, while rivals in
competitive industries cannot do so.220 
While all studies found a correlation between a restatement and
a stock price decline by rivals, they provided different explanations
for that decline. Professor Gleason and her collaborators attributed
the decline to two factors: contagion and learning. Not surprisingly,
the authors found that the effect was more pronounced when the
restating firm was relatively large and when restating and nonre-
stating firms used the same external auditor.221 They also found
that firms with high accruals—sales recorded before cash is re-
215. Id. The authors did not disaggregate how much of that loss was the result of
shareholders’ concerns about the firms’ accounting and how much was the result of the
expected changes in investment strategy.
216. See Goldman et al., supra note 15 (manuscript at 11). 
217. Id. at 15.
218. Id.
219. See id. at 18.
220. Joel Peress, Product Market Competition, Insider Trading, and Stock Market
Efficiency, 65 J. FIN. 1, 5 (2010).
221. Gleason et al., supra note 211, at 84.
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ceived, also known as accounts receivable—suffered greater losses
than those with relatively low accruals.222 
Professor Gleason and her collaborators also found evidence that
fraud interferes with economic learning: a restatement conveys new
information about deteriorating industry conditions and suggests
that the misrepresentation produced overinvestment by both the
restating firm and the industry.223 
Durnev and Mangen complemented Gleason and her collabora-
tors’ findings and showed that rivals significantly reduce their
investments within three years after the restatement.224 They
argued that rivals rely on their peers’ financial statements in
deciding whether and how much to invest. A restatement thus
conveys new information—namely, that the rivals overinvested in
reliance on the false financial statements issued by peers.225 Rivals
reevaluate their expected return from existing investments and
reduce current investment in response.226 
Durnev and Mangen also found that restatements have a greater
impact on rivals’ investments when restating firms have a larger
market share.227 The finding makes sense because there are fewer
firms in more concentrated industries, so a misrepresentation by an
industry leader is more likely to be relied on and copied. 
In sum, while it is difficult to disaggregate the effect of contagion
versus the revelation of investment choices, the studies suggest that
both effects are at work.
2. Debt Market Externalities 
In addition to contagion and investment reconsideration, false
financial disclosures increase the cost of debt for fraudulent firms
222. Id. at 99. Accruals more accurately reflect the business prospects of a firm, but they
are less reliable than measuring sales by cash flow because management can exercise more
discretion in accounting for accruals.
223. Id. at 94.
224. Durnev & Mangen, supra note 15, at 697 (finding that competitors on average reduce
investments by 5.6 percent in the year of the restatement, by 5.2 percent the following year,
by 2.6 percent the year thereafter, and by 16.2 percent in the third year after the
restatement).
225. Id. at 702-03.
226. Id. at 680-81.
227. Id. at 706.
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and their rivals both before and after fraud is unmasked. No
empirical studies to date have estimated the cost of the debt-market
distortion during fraud. Assuming that the supply of capital is
limited, fraud should distort the allocation of debt among firms. As
fraudulent firms appear healthier than they really are, they can
negotiate better borrowing terms than justified. Conversely,
assuming that capital is scarce, honest firms should face relatively
worse borrowing terms than they would absent fraud.228 In a
competitive market, higher costs of capital translate into lower
levels of investment by honest firms, depressing their employment
and reducing their market share. Because fraudulent firms are
riskier than they appear, the net cost of misallocated debt capital is
positive. 
Professors Files and Gurun studied what happens to the cost of
debt for rivals, suppliers, and customers of fraudulent firms after a
restatement. The authors reviewed loan terms of firms that
borrowed within a year of a rival’s restatement and found that
lenders increased loan costs by five to nine basis points.229 They
found similar effects when looking at loans to firms whose major
suppliers or customers restated their earnings.230 In addition to
demanding a higher interest rate, lenders were more likely to ask
for collateral and impose more restrictive financial covenants.231 
The authors demonstrated that lenders overreact to misreporting
within the industry and along the supply chain: lenders tighten
lending standards on rival firms regardless of their accounting
quality or overall economic health.232 The authors argued that
higher cost of borrowing is caused by contagion,233 but additional
explanations are possible. First, a restatement is correlated with
bankruptcy, which usually leads to only partial loan repayment.
Banks face reserve requirements, and a default reduces their ability
228. Bar-Gill & Bebchuk, supra note 124, at 24.
229. Rebecca Files & Umit G. Gurun, Lenders’ Response to Restatements Along the Supply
Chain 20 (Oct. 1, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1636862.
230. See id. at 33 (reporting an increase in the interest rate spread by at least seven basis
points).
231. Id. at 27-28.
232. Id. at 29.
233. Id. at 21-23. 
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to extend new credit. Assuming that the supply of capital is not
unlimited, the price of credit must increase after a restatement even
in the absence of contagion. Second, fraud reveals that the prospects
of an industry are less rosy than previously believed, and thus
rivals’ and suppliers’ risk profiles are worse, even if they never
engaged in accounting improprieties themselves. 
Professors Files and Gurun reported that lenders imposed rela-
tively stricter postrestatement loan terms in competitive industries
than in concentrated industries, measured by firms’ relative market
shares.234 The authors attributed it to two factors: the fact that it is
more difficult for firms in competitive industries to capture the
restating firm’s market share, and contagion—the perception that
firms in competitive industries are more likely to mimic accounting
practices of their peers.235 But there is another possible explanation:
firms in concentrated industries are able to pass the cost of business
shocks, like a restatement or fraud, onto employees, suppliers, and
customers, and thus protect their profits.236 Knowing that, lenders
demand a lower risk premium.
C. The Cost of Fraud to the Government and Communities
Finally, fraud distorts government policy, reduces the tax base,
produces unemployment, and harms communities. Government
often bases policy decisions on required disclosures. Gregory Sidak
argues that WorldCom’s fraud distorted government policy, in
addition to wreaking havoc on the firm’s rivals.237 Quoting former
FCC Chairman Michael K. Powell, Sidak notes that federal and
state governments use disclosures to set regulatory fees, determine
interstate access charges for telecommunications, set rates for
unbundled services, evaluate whether the division of federal-state
jurisdiction is proper, and perform many other activities.238 
When fraud results in business exit or reduces profits and
incomes, all levels of government suffer from reduced tax revenues
234. Id. at 21-22.
235. Id.
236. See discussion infra Part V.
237. See Sidak, supra note 196, at 236-37.
238. Id. at 236.
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and increased demand for social spending. A large firm’s failure or
retrenchment causes disproportionate impacts on the community in
which it is located. After Enron declared bankruptcy and several
other local companies reported fraud, Houston, an otherwise pros-
perous and growing city, experienced a recession that was both
longer and deeper than the national recession.239 Houston’s unem-
ployment rate is generally lower than the national average.240 The
Houston economy is dependent on oil prices and rises and falls with
the price of crude oil.241 From 1999 to 2006, the price of crude oil
tripled, and so Houston should have boomed.242 Instead, Houston’s
unemployment increased in early 2002 (Enron declared bankruptcy
in December 2001) and remained between 0.5 and 1 percent above
the national average until late 2006.243 
V. DETERMINANTS OF THE COST’S MAGNITUDE 
Not all financial misrepresentations are created equal. Some
firms are more likely to misrepresent their performance than
others, and some financial misrepresentations are more harmful
than others. This Part briefly explains what factors increase the
likelihood that a firm will commit fraud. It then analyzes what
elements determine the social welfare effects of each occurrence of
fraud.
A. The Likelihood of Fraud
The observed prevalence of fraud produces a biased estimate of
its actual prevalence, and there is evidence that many frauds go
239. See GREATER HOUS. P’SHIP, THE ECONOMY AT A GLANCE: HOUSTON 1 (2011), available
at http://www.houston.org/pdf/research/eag.pdf (discussing concerns about Houston’s reces-
sion).
240. See id. at 10.
241. See id. at 4.
242. The price of crude oil went from—inflation adjusted—$22.79 per barrel in 1999 to
$66.47 per barrel in 2006. Historical Crude Oil Prices, INFLATIONDATA.COM (June 14, 2012),
http://inflationdata.com/inflation/inflation_rate/historical_oil_prices_table.asp.
243. See Economic Development: Workforce, GREATER HOUS. PARTNERSHIP, http://www.
houston.org/economic-development/facts-figures/workforce/index.aspx (last visited Mar. 26,
2013). 
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undetected.244 Nevertheless, some observations are worth noting.
Larger firms are more likely to face an SEC enforcement action for
earnings manipulation: the largest 10 percent of firms by market
capitalization accounted for 14.7 percent of SEC enforcement
actions for fraud between 1982 and 2005, while the smallest decile
featured in 5.1 percent of accounting and auditing enforcement
releases (that is, SEC enforcement actions).245 Greater visibility and
scrutiny might explain more detection among the larger firms, but
their ability to afford the best auditors should mitigate against
fraud in the first place.
Firms in growth industries, like computer software and hard-
ware, retail and services, and those with substantial investments in
intangible assets also are more likely to commit accounting fraud
than firms in stable industries with substantial fixed assets, such
as refining or utilities.246 Reported value of intangible assets de-
pends to a greater extent on managers’ judgment calls and thus is
more easily manipulated. Firms with high P/E ratios, those seeking
to raise new capital, and those whose managers’ pay is closely
linked to stock price performance relative to rivals’ performance—
that is, indexed stock options—also are more likely to misstate their
financials.247
Finally, economists generally believe that product market
competition should reduce the firms’ proclivity for fraud because it
reduces agency costs,248 but the relationship “is not as easy to
244. See Gerakos & Kovrijnykh, supra note 105, at 4 (finding that, on average, 17-20
percent of firms with sufficient data on COMPUSTAT exhibit significant earnings
manipulation); see also Dyck et al., supra note 85, at 11 (suggesting that three out of four
frauds avoid detection).
245. Dechow et al., supra note 91, at 32 tbl.2A.
246. Id. at 32 tbl.2B, 34.
247. See id. at 42; Wang & Winton, supra note 158, at 21-22. This observation casts doubt
on Professor Bebchuk and Fried’s proposal that stock options be indexed to better align
managers’ incentives with those of the shareholders. See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED,
PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 141-
42 (2004).
248. See K.J. Martijn Cremers et al., Takeover Defenses and Competition: The Role of
Stakeholders, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 791 (2008) (showing that protections from hostile
takeovers reduce market value of firms in concentrated industries, but not of those in
competitive industries, suggesting that product market competition disciplines management);
Xavier Giroud & Holger M. Mueller, Does Corporate Governance Matter in Competitive
Industries?, 95 J. FIN. ECON. 312 (2010) (reporting similar findings); cf. MILTON FRIEDMAN,
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formalize as one might think.”249 Professors Wang and Winton find
evidence that there is a kernel of truth to the notion: firms in com-
petitive industries during periods of normal growth are generally
about half as likely as their peers in concentrated industries to
commit fraud.250 The effect is most pronounced in those competitive
industries in which financial statements are highly comparable:
each firm’s disclosure provides information about other firms’ finan-
cial disclosures.251 If a manager misrepresents the firm’s earnings,
outsiders can more easily detect that the disclosure is false by
comparing it with disclosures of honest rivals.252 
During periods of rapid growth, however, the propensity of oligop-
olies to commit fraud remains unchanged, whereas in competitive
industries the likelihood of fraud quadruples as compared with its
normal rate and exceeds that of firms in concentrated industries.253
Periods of growth eliminate the constraints that competitive pro-
duct markets ordinarily impose. The combination of easy money
and the need for external financing to increase capacity creates a
powerful incentive to misrepresent financials.254 Misrepresentations
that paint a rosier picture than true further spur overinvestment in
capacity. The bust that inevitably follows exposes both the fraud
and the overinvestment, leading to business failure and significant
distortion in product markets as well as markets for labor and
capital.255 
ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 15, 34-37, 180-81 (1953) (describing the common view but
arguing against it).
249. Bengt R. Hölmstrom & Jean Tirole, The Theory of the Firm, in 1 HANDBOOK OF
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 61, 97 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989), cited
in Karthik Balakrishnan & Daniel A. Cohen, Product Market Competition and Financial
Accounting Misreporting 3 n.2 (Sept. 14, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1927427.
250. Wang & Winton, supra note 158, at 26.
251. Balakrishnan & Cohen, supra note 249, at 5, 12.
252. Id. at 3-4; see also Reese Darragh, Diamond Foods Accounting Scandal Stems from
Years of Bad Practices, COMPLIANCEX (Mar. 20, 2012), http://complianceX.com/diamond-foods-
accounting-scandal-stems-from-years-of-bad-practices.
253. See Wang & Winton, supra note 158, at 39 tbl.3.
254. See id. at 18.
255. The Internet and telecommunication booms are recent examples. An older example
includes railroads: extensive miles of track were laid, including spurs to future towns not yet
built, by firms in the railroad industry only to be followed by numerous bankruptcies in the
late 1870s. Railroads in the 1870s, AMERICAN-RAILS.COM, http://www.american-rails.
com/railroads-in-the-1870s.html (last visited Mar. 26. 2013). The Chicago Sun Times wrote
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B. The Size of the Distortion from Fraud 
Several factors affect the costliness of accounting fraud: (1) size,
duration, and type of the misrepresentation; (2) characteristics of
the fraudulent firm; and (3) characteristics of the markets in which
the firm operates. 
1. Fraud Characteristics
A number of studies suggest that duration affects the cost of the
misrepresentation: the longer fraud remains undetected, the greater
the distortion.256 Even though a single-period misrepresentation can
inflate the stock price substantially, persistent misrepresentations
distort economic decisions more.257 Making things worse, managers
announce income-decreasing restatements of greater magnitude
more slowly than they announce restatements of smaller magnitude
or those that increase income.258
Professors Yu and Yu find evidence that firms’ political spending
also delays discovery of fraud. They report that fraud persists longer
and is less likely to be detected if the firm lobbies than if it does not.
Moreover, they find that firms spend more on lobbying while the
fraud is ongoing, compared with both nonfraud lobbying peers and
their own lobbying expenditures before fraud.259
The type of the misrepresentation matters also. Rivals, suppliers,
and large customers are more likely to use and rely on a misstate-
in 1872 that wealth from the railroads “will so overflow our coffers with gold that our paupers
will be millionaires.” Illinois Railroad Boom, 1865 to 1873, E. ST. LOUIS ACTION RES. PROJECT,
http://www.eslarp.uiuc.edu/ibex/archive/vignettes/rrboom.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2013). 
256. See Brown & Angus, supra note 104, at 28 (observing that persistent fraud is far more
damaging than intermittent fraud); James J. Park, Assessing the Materiality of Financial
Misstatements, 34 J. CORP. L. 513, 550 (2009) (using fundamental analysis to argue that
persistent misstatements ought to be presumptively material).
257. Cf. William Kinney et al., Earnings Surprise “Materiality” as Measured by Stock
Returns, 40 J. ACCT. RES. 1297, 1309-10 (2002) (finding that the consequences of missing an
earnings target by one cent vary widely, depending on context). 
258. Myers et al., supra note 195, at 25.
259. Frank Yu & Xiaoyun Yu, Corporate Lobbying and Fraud Detection, 46 J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1865, 1865-66, 1882, 1884 (2011) (finding that lobbying firms evade
fraud detection 117 days longer and are 38 percent less likely to be detected by regulators,
and that they spend 77 percent more on lobbying than honest firms and 29 percent more
during fraud periods than during nonfraud periods). 
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ment of core accounts, such as revenues, sales, market share, and
cost of goods sold, than on the firm’s pension fund returns.260
The size of the misrepresentation, and not just its duration or
type, increases the distortion, but the correlation is weaker. A
quantitatively large financial misstatement can substantially inflate
the value of the company and distort capital and labor market
allocation, as well as the firm’s product market decisions. The dis-
covery of fraud immediately causes the stock price to fall substan-
tially, lenders to accelerate their loans, and customers to flee, which
might lead to insolvency.261 The large size also suggests that man-
agement was aware of the misstatement, further increasing the
capital-market penalty and causing a larger postfraud adjustment
in business activities.262 
2. Fraudulent Firm Characteristics
Firm size affects the cost of financial misrepresentations. Larger
firms, like Enron and WorldCom, use more human and financial
capital and produce a larger displacement in the aggregate.263 Rivals
are more likely to rely on and copy dominant firms’ behavior, in-
cluding their accounting practices, than they are to copy smaller
firms.264 
3. Market Characteristics
The effect of competition in the markets for inputs and outputs on
the cost of securities fraud is complicated. Product market competi-
260. See Dechow et al., supra note 91, at 19.
261. Park, supra note 256, at 553.
262. See id. at 554 (suggesting that when misstatements are large, it is more likely that
management was aware of them, or at least should have been aware). The notion that large
frauds are worse than small frauds produced the rule-like quantitative standard that a
financial misstatement is immaterial unless it misrepresented net income by more than 5
percent. See Matthew J. Barrett, The SEC and Accounting, in Part Through the Eyes of
Pacioli, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 837, 874 (2005). That standard has since been replaced with
a qualitative standard for materiality of a financial misstatement. SEC Staff Accounting
Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150, 45,151-52 (Aug. 19, 1999).
263. Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 11, at 374-75.
264. See Gleason et al., supra note 211, at 103-04 (finding that competitors’ stock prices
decline significantly when the restating firm is large but show no effect when the restating
firm is small); Wang & Winton, supra note 158, at 2.
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tion generally reduces the likelihood that a firm’s managers will
commit fraud.265 Similarly, if committed, accounting fraud in con-
centrated industries is more likely to distort rivals’ economic be-
havior.266 In markets with low barriers to entry, fraud encourages
inefficient business entry.267 In addition, market concentration af-
fects the size of the distortion from fraud as fraudulent firms change
their pricing and output. 
Empirical evidence suggests that rivals in concentrated markets
are better able to capture the fraudulent firm’s market share after
it is caught, but that the product market itself often shrinks in the
aftermath of accounting fraud.268 In contrast, demand for audit,
legal, and consulting services often increases after financial scan-
dals. 
Relative market competition also affects who ultimately bears the
cost of fraud. The conventional wisdom assumes that investors as
residual owners bear the cost of securities fraud. But this conclusion
holds only for firms in truly competitive industries and in truly
competitive, perfectly informed, and frictionless markets for labor,
capital, and products. In all other cases—the vast majority—
fraudulent firms, their rivals, and suppliers are able to shield their
profits and their stock prices and pass along the cost of business
shocks from the more competitive financial markets to the relatively
less competitive real markets for labor and product markets.269 
Professor Joel Peress finds support for the relative competi-
tiveness hypothesis in the product markets: firms use market power
to pass on business shocks to customers and insulate profits.270
265. See Wang & Winton, supra note 158, at 39 tbl.3.
266. See Balakrishnan & Cohen, supra note 249, at 9.
267. Id.
268. A misrepresentation of sales figures, for example, causes firms in the industry to
overestimate demand for their product and overinvest. Price competition below marginal cost
further increases demand. The correction increases prices to at least marginal cost and
reduces investment, thereby shrinking the product market. 
269. Cf. Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in
CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33, 34 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988)
(observing that firms can transfer rents from employees to shareholders).
270. See Peress, supra note 220, at 4-5; see also Annie Gasparro, Starbucks Bumps Up
Prices, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 2012, at B2 (reporting that the firm’s customers were less sensitive
to price increases than its rivals and so the firm decided to raise prices of brewed coffee to
offset higher costs caused by futures contracts for coffee—in other words, to shield investors
from its market misjudgment by passing along the cost to its customers).
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Profits and stock prices in concentrated industries are more stable
than expected, while product prices fluctuate wildly. Kedia and
Philippon show that fraudulent firms and their rivals shift some of
the postdisclosure cost of fraud onto employees.271 After discovery of
fraud, rivals capture the fraudulent firm’s market share but do not
increase employment.272 Files and Gurun suggest that the lack of
product market competition enables borrowers to negotiate better
terms than their peers in more competitive industries in the
aftermath of fraud,273 presumably because they can pass the cost on
to their customers or employees. 
4. Summary
Accounting fraud at WorldCom was a perfect storm of factors that
increased its economic destructiveness. The firm was very large,
with a market capitalization of $186 billion at its peak.274 It
misrepresented salient information used to evaluate its and its
rivals’ performances; it capitalized current expenses and reported
line costs far below its rivals, who were hard pressed to compete.275
The misrepresentation was substantial, over $12 billion, and went
on for a while.276 Finally, WorldCom operated in a highly concen-
trated and regulated telecommunications market.277 Its falsely
reported actions were copied by rivals and adopted by the govern-
ment in developing telecommunications policy.278 Smaller frauds of
shorter duration by smaller firms in very competitive markets
during normal times (that is, not bubbles) will inevitably cause
losses that are more contained but no less painful for terminated
employees, disappointed creditors, and contractual partners.
271. See Kedia & Philippon, supra note 57, at 2195, 2197.
272. Id. at 2197.
273. See Files & Gurun, supra note 229, at 21-22.
274. Meet the Market’s Biggest Losers, CNNMONEY, http://money.cnn.com/galleries/2010/
fortune/1002/gallery.biggest_losers.fortune/10.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2013).
275. BERESFORD ET AL., supra note 1, at 2.
276. Bower & Gilson, supra note 179, at 20.
277. See Romar & Calkins, supra note 3, at 1-3 (outlining the effect on the industry).
278. See Sidak, supra note 196, at 236-37.
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VI. IMPLICATIONS AND SOLUTIONS
A. Implications
Financial misrepresentations generate costs above and beyond
those suffered by shareholders of fraud-committing firms because
they (1) induce socially wasteful investments by creditors, employ-
ees, and other stakeholders—such as vendors and suppliers—while
fraud is ongoing; (2) distort the fraudulent firm’s decisions as
managers try to mask fraud; (3) interfere with rivals’ ability to learn
from the fraudulent firm’s disclosures; and (4) produce contagion
after fraud is revealed as well as a costly adjustment by sharehold-
ers and nonshareholder constituents to new information. 
Combined, these four outcomes lead to several tentative conclu-
sions for fraud regulation and enforcement. First, false disclosures
cause intrafirm harms to shareholders and nonshareholder
constituents, as well as external harms to rivals, other firms
competing for scarce labor and capital, and their constituents.279
Diffuse harms suggest that no single private party, or class of pri-
vate parties, has optimal incentives to cause managers to inter-
nalize the cost of fraud: not investors,280 not exchanges,281 and not
analysts and others who trade on information they have gathered.282
Diffuse costs also suggest that there are real limits to corporate self-
279. See BEASLEY ET AL., supra note 54, at 1; Bower & Gilson, supra note 179, at 20.
280. See Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 55 (2002) (arguing against public
regulation of accounting fraud because shareholders, in particular institutional investors, can
press for changes in governance both by direct communication with managers and by making
shareholder proposals); see also Joseph W. Yockey, On the Role and Regulation of Private
Negotiations in Governance, 61 S.C. L. REV. 171, 205-13 (2009) (arguing that Regulation FD
impedes direct negotiation between shareholders and managers). For a less optimistic view
of shareholder negotiations with management, see Urska Velikonja, Negotiating Executive
Compensation in Lieu of Regulation, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 621, 625-26 (2010).
281. See Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453, 1455 (1997)
(arguing that the benefits of regulatory competition would best be achieved by devolving more
authority to securities exchanges); Pritchard, supra note 94, at 928-29 (arguing that
exchanges could enforce antifraud rules at lower cost than private litigation or securities
regulators).
282. See, e.g., Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities
Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 714 (2006).
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governance, where managers are expected to maximize shareholder
wealth, to prevent fraud efficiently.
Second, shareholders may be the theoretical residual owners, but
because of diversification and the fraud discount, their exposure to
securities fraud is quite limited. Employees and trade creditors, on
the other hand, face significant risk of securities fraud, particularly
in concentrated industries, during investment booms or “bubbles,”
in industries in which they make substantial firm-specific invest-
ments, and in industries in which exit is costly. 
Third, for every fraud that is caught, there are many that remain
hidden. Although financial markets are indifferent to hidden fraud
to the extent that its general level remains the same over time,
firms and individuals in the real economy are not. Managers rely on
financial disclosures of other firms to develop their business strat-
egies. When other firms’ disclosures are false, managers of honest
firms make misguided investments. They pay more for capital and
labor than their fraudulent peers. That cost is borne to some extent
by providers of capital, but also by managers and employees of
honest firms. Under current law, they are not compensated for their
injuries even when frauds are exposed, let alone for those that
remain hidden.
Employees, trade creditors, and rival firms could, in general, rely
less on their firm’s or their peers’ financial disclosures—a costly
proposition as reliable information about the business environment
is costly to obtain—particularly when those disclosures appear too
good to be true. But that is exactly the problem with accounting
fraud. If it is to work, it must be convincing. The best frauds were
“successful” precisely because managers were able to fool the many
markets in which the firms operated that their statements were
truthful. The firm’s contracting parties may want to believe the
information that is being disclosed because of their optimism bias.
Even if rivals did doubt a fraudulent firm’s numbers, their own
shareholders and market analysts might push them toward fudging
their numbers.283 
283. In an environment with low enforcement and high rewards for fraud, all competitors
may find it optimal to commit fraud, even though the market overall would be better off if no
one committed fraud. See Ing-Haw Cheng, Corporate Governance Spillovers 1 (Apr. 10, 2011)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1299652 (observing that
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B. Solutions
Many of the existing mechanisms designed to protect investors by
increasing transparency and reducing the incentive to commit
fraud, including audit committee independence, audit partner ro-
tation, and SEC enforcement actions, also reduce the cost of fraud
to nonshareholders.
A common theme in the explanation for why fraud harms
nonshareholders is that nonshareholders actually rely on fraudulent
financial disclosures. Increasing the accuracy of disclosure without
increasing the cost of compliance is one possible strategy. Reducing
the incentive to commit fraud in the first place is another, either by
sanctioning individual wrongdoers more frequently or by reducing
the appetite for fraud by changing compensation practices. Finally,
the Article singles out employees as a class of nonshareholders that
is consistently harmed by fraud and particularly powerless to
diversify that risk. The last Section in this Part thus considers the
viability of two compensation mechanisms: private rights of action
and an administrative victim compensation fund. 
1. Making Disclosure Less Public
Disclosure has been the preferred regulatory tool of American
securities lawmakers since the 1930s. In addition to providing
information to investors, increased disclosure enhances competition,
and hence static efficiency, by informing rivals of profit opportuni-
ties and leading to production levels more consistent with marginal
cost pricing.284 Disclosure of relevant business information produces
a positive externality to the disclosing firm’s rivals, who learn about
profitable business opportunities; its suppliers and customers, who
can drive harder bargains; and its employees, who demand higher
pay or leave.285 
Firms provide disclosures for their present and future sharehold-
ers by filing their quarterly and annual reports with the SEC, which
makes them publicly available through its online database
fraud at one firm can lead to increased misbehavior at other firms).
284. See Fox, supra note 36, at 1345-46.
285. See id.
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EDGAR.286 If information were provided to current shareholders
directly, as is the case with privately held firms, one might expect
the external cost of fraud to be smaller, assuming all else is equal.
Rivals would make economic decisions independently of their peers,
and with fewer eyes looking, fraudulent managers might be under
less pressure to manipulate earnings and to change hiring, invest-
ment, and pricing to conceal their fraud. Less scrutiny, however,
would likely increase the prevalence of fraud. More fraud would, in
turn, increase the cost of capital for all firms and depress overall
economic growth.
2. Improving Disclosure by Improving Compliance
The current disclosure, audit, and compliance regime imposed on
public firms is not cheap. The recently adopted JOBS Act is prem-
ised on the supposition that the cost of disclosure and compliance
exceeds its benefit to investors, in particular for “smaller” newly
public firms. The JOBS Act reduced disclosure and audit obligations
for five years from the initial public offering for “emerging growth
companies”—that is, companies with less than $1 billion in annual
revenues.287 But if the aggregate social cost of securities fraud by
public firms is quite large, as this Article suggests, we should be
willing to spend substantial resources to curb fraud, even at the cost
of losing marginal firms to private markets. 
Our public firms already spend substantial sums on compliance,
but much of that is, as Professor Krawiec charmingly called it,
“cosmetic.”288 If the same resources could be deployed more effi-
ciently, better disclosure ought to reduce the incidence and the cost
of accounting fraud. This Section briefly considers forensic audits
and qui tam actions for securities fraud as tools to improve disclo-
sure.
Since 2002, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has required that audit
committees select their firms’ auditor, but most firms retained the
286. Filing & Forms, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml
(last visited Mar. 26, 2013).
287. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 101, 126 Stat. 306, 307
(2012) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(19)).
288. Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance,
81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487 (2003).
2013] THE COST OF SECURITIES FRAUD 1949
auditor they used before the Act was adopted.289 A firm changes its
auditor only in the aftermath of scandal, whether its own or the
auditor’s. As a result, auditors know the managers that they audit,
rely on the information that those managers provide, and tend to
view the firm they audit as the “client,” not the adversary.290 The
symbiotic relationship at best dampens the auditor’s appetite for
suspicious questioning and at worst leads auditors to rubber-stamp
fraud.291 
Severing the agency relationship between the firm that selects
the auditor, provides the information, and pays for the audit ought
to reduce the conflict of interest and improve audit quality.292
Forensic audits are usually commissioned by courts or enforcement
agencies during an investigation into accounting improprieties, such
as during the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. Although they are ex-
pensive and time consuming, they are also very effective. 
For example, 10 percent of public firms could be randomly se-
lected every year and required to undergo a forensic audit.293
Accounting fraud is both more common and more harmful to non-
shareholders in concentrated industries, so those could be targeted
more often. Alternately, a forensic audit could be ordered if red flags
were raised, such as bankruptcy294 or certain accounting practices
289. See Floyd Norris, Companies May Face Rule to Shift Audit Firms, N.Y. TIMES, June
3, 2011, at B2 (reporting that firms and auditors have strongly resisted a rule that would
require them to rotate audit firms every seven or ten years). Except, of course, for firms that
used Arthur Andersen in 2001 and had to switch when the firm was indicted for destroying
evidence of fraud in its audits of Enron.
290. See id.
291. A senior auditor with one of the “Big Four” firms suggested that all four let their
largest clients get away with suspicious accounting for fear of losing their business. Interview
with Anonymous, Manager, KPMG, in Annapolis, Md. (Apr. 27, 2012). For a more detailed
investigation of auditing and auditors’ incentives, see Brown, supra note 15.
292. Lawrence A. Cunningham, Choosing Gatekeepers: The Financial Statement Insurance
Alternative to Auditor Liability, 52 UCLA L. REV. 413, 415 (2004) (proposing financial
statement insurance); Joshua Ronen, Corporate Audits and How to Fix Them, 24 J. ECON.
PERSP. 189, 189-90 (2010) (same).
293. Alm, Jackson, and McKee report that IRS tax audits deter tax noncompliance. James
Alm et al., The Effects of Communication Among Taxpayers on Compliance, in IRS RESEARCH
BULLETIN: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2004 RESEARCH CONFERENCE 37, 37 (2005), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/04alm.pdf. Forensic accounting audits, likewise, are expected
to produce higher quality financial disclosures.
294. About one-third of firms charged with accounting fraud end in bankruptcy, and of the
firms that file for bankruptcy, about a third are found to have committed fraud before filing.
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that have been found to signal fraud, such as high and/or spiking
accruals.295 The SEC might not have the resources to conduct many
forensic audits, but the cost could be shifted to firms. To offset the
cost to firms, other compliance requirements could be lifted, such as
the controversial auditor attestation to management’s assessment
of the firm’s internal controls under Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s section
404, or even the mandatory annual audit by the firm’s hired
auditor.296 
In addition, the SEC and judges could take into account aggregate
social losses from fraud when choosing sanctions for fraudulent
firms and their managers. The SEC declared in 2006 that it would
consider “the extent of societal harm” when penalizing firms and
managers for securities fraud,297 but it has yet to consider harm
beyond that suffered by the shareholders. Similarly, the federal
sentencing guidelines allow judges to take into consideration the
total economic harm the offense caused,298 but the author is not
aware of any judge who has looked beyond the shareholders. In
addition, shifting the sanction onto managers ought to reduce the
likelihood of fraud.299
Finally, in Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?, Dyck,
Morse, and Zingales found that employees discovered and reported
19 percent of all frauds, more than any other group, including
See supra note 111 and accompanying text. This suggests that courts reviewing bankruptcy
petitions should routinely look for securities fraud. But see Kelli A. Alces, Limiting the SEC’s
Role in Bankruptcy, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 631, 631 (2010) (arguing that the SEC should
not investigate and punish bankrupt firms).
295. BEASLEY ET AL., supra note 54, at 45 (noting that revenue fraud is consistently the
most common variety of accounting fraud).
296. Section 404(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires the public firm’s auditor to attest
to, and report on, management’s assessment of its internal controls. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub.
L. No. 107-204, § 404(b), 116 Stat. 745, 789 (2002). The Dodd-Frank Act exempted small firms
with less than $75 million in equity—4700 public firms—from having to comply with section
404(b) because of the common perception that the cost of compliance exceeded the benefit to
investors. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 989G(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1948 (2010) (to be
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7262(c)); see 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (2011); see also Brown, supra note
15, at 194 (proposing an end to the mandatory audit).
297. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement of the Securities and Exchange
Commission Concerning Financial Penalties (Jan. 4, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/press/2006-4.htm.
298. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b) (2011). 
299. See Velikonja, supra note 25, at 1283-84.
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financial regulators, auditors, and securities analysts.300 Employees
blew the whistle even before the Sarbanes-Oxley Act protected them
from retaliation, and before any monetary incentives were available. 
The Dodd-Frank Act authorized monetary awards for whistle-
blowers whose tips lead to a successful SEC enforcement action.301
While awards for whistleblowers do not prevent fraud per se, they
might reduce its duration, at least on the margin. If employees are
deterred from reporting fraud because they might never work again,
compensation is a useful incentive. The awards under the Dodd-
Frank Act are conditional on the SEC successfully pursuing the
enforcement action and are limited to the SEC’s discretion. A true
qui tam action that would eliminate the SEC as the intermediary
and allow employees to sue for fraud directly would strengthen
employees’ incentives and give them greater control over the
process. Fraud duration is an important determinant of the cost of
fraud to nonshareholders. It is reasonable to assume that, on the
margin, employee qui tam actions would expose fraud sooner and
thus decrease the social welfare losses. To reduce the likelihood of
opportunistic private lawsuits, the employee could be required to
report fraud to the SEC first and wait to see if the SEC takes up the
case within a certain period of time. If it does not, the employee
could pursue the case privately. 
3. Victim Compensation
As this Article suggests, employees—as well as trade creditors,
suppliers, vendors, customers, and their employees to the extent
that firms externalize the cost—are among the victims of securities
fraud who cannot diversify the risk of loss from fraud.302 To the ex-
tent that firms shift some of the cost of fraud from shareholders to
employees—by reneging on implicit contracts not to fire, cutting
300. Alexander Dyck et al., Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud? 53 tbl.2 (Ctr. for
Research in Sec. Prices, Working Paper No. 618, 2007), available at http://faculty.
chicagobooth.edu/finance/papers/who%20blows%20the%20whistle.pdf. 
301. Dodd-Frank Act § 922(a), 124 Stat. at 1841 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78a).
The SEC has since adopted rules implementing the statutory provision. See 17 C.F.R.
§§ 240.21F-3, 249.1801 (providing for a reward when the enforcement action yields a
monetary sanction of $1,000,000 or more).
302. See supra Part III.
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pay, or extracting more work for the same pay—it would make not
only practical but also economic sense to require shareholders to
internalize the cost of the firm’s activity.303 Requiring fraudulent
firms and their managers to compensate all victims of fraud would
seem to be the next rational step. This Subsection considers em-
ployee lawsuits and a compensation fund, administered by a public
agency, as possible remedies.
a. Victim Lawsuits
Rallying against securities fraud class actions is a favorite pas-
time of securities law professors. Class actions are costly; they
overcompensate shareholders, who can diversify away the cost of
fraud, and fail to deter the dishonest managers because they never
pay out of pocket.304 Fraud harms employees, on the other hand,
because they stay with the fraudulent firm in reliance on the false
picture of its prosperity. When the firm discloses fraud, they lose
both their jobs and their financial investment in the firm through
their retirement accounts or deferred compensation, costs that could
have been avoided with accurate disclosure.
303. See discussion supra Part V.
304. See e.g., Alexander, supra note 56, at 1509-11 (proposing that damages be replaced
with fines); Arlen & Carney, supra note 70, at 720 (proposing that firm-level liability be
eliminated); Baer, supra note 55, at 1035 (proposing that insurance replace private actions);
Bratton & Wachter, supra note 93, at 69-70 (proposing that fraud-on-the-market class actions
be abolished and the SEC step up its enforcement efforts); John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper
Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 349-
53 (2004) (proposing shifting liability to auditors); John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the
Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
1534, 1582-84 (2006) (arguing that the SEC should exempt nontrading corporate issuers from
liability so that plaintiffs would sue corporate insiders and gatekeepers instead); Alicia Davis
Evans, The Investor Compensation Fund, 33 J. CORP. L. 223, 233 (2007) (proposing insurance
in lieu of the class action); Donald C. Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open-Market
Securities Fraud, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 639, 641-42 (1996) (proposing capping damages in securities
class actions); Frank Partnoy, Barbarians at the Gatekeepers?: A Proposal for a Modified Strict
Liability Regime, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 491, 540-46 (2001) (proposing strict liability on
gatekeepers for misstatements and omissions); Pritchard, supra note 94, at 983 (proposing
penalties instead of damages to be imposed by exchanges instead of individual plaintiffs);
Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring the Relationship
Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 10b-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 1301 (2008)
(proposing that the SEC screen securities class actions).
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Without a federal cause of action like the shareholder class
action, employees would have to rely on the common law cause of
action for fraud.305 Courts have been extremely reluctant to allow
employees to sue firms for common law fraud by managers.306 They
have held either that the vague statements firms made about the
firms’ prospects were not enforceable promises that induced reliance
—for example, “The plant is now profitable”—or were forward-
looking statements on which legal reliance was unwarranted—for
example, “We will not close the plant if it remains profitable.”307
Moreover, proving damages would pose severe evidentiary prob-
lems. The value of shareholders’ residual claims can be determined
with relative ease by looking at the stock price. But even in
shareholder litigation, serious event studies are needed to suss out
precisely what part of the stock price decline was caused by fraud
and what is noise.308 Employment contracts are not tradeable and
their value is not easily ascertainable, let alone any loss in the value
of their human capital that results from fraud. Fraud causes
employees to lose firm-specific investments. The value of that
investment, and the extent to which employees have already been
compensated, is difficult to calculate. Many managers commit fraud
when firms are faltering. Employees cannot easily prove that their
jobs would not have been among those eliminated in the face of poor
firm performance. If employees refrained from job searches, it would
be very difficult to find an alternative way to show their opportunity
cost. They would also face the challenge of showing the cost of
reputational harm and disaggregating it from noise in the labor
market. Inevitably, firms would worry that if workers are compen-
sated for joblessness, they will stop looking for work. The question
arises whether employees’ claims should receive priority in bank-
ruptcy, similar to the shareholder settlements in WorldCom and
Enron.
Finally, the fact-specific nature of these actions would likely make
it cost prohibitive if brought individually; the cost of litigation would
305. See Greenfield, supra note 142, at 754 (discussing the lack of a federal remedy for
defrauded employees).
306. See id. at 720.
307. Id. at 755.
308. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 93, at 87-93 (discussing the difficulty in calculating
shareholder losses).
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exceed the loss to any individual employee. Additionally, the recent
Supreme Court decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes suggests
that class certification would be difficult.309 The presumption of
reliance in fraud-on-the-market cases used by public shareholders
would not be available for employee claims. Employees would
probably have to show actual reliance on particular false disclosures
or statements, and the facts surrounding reliance would inevitably
vary from employee to employee. Without commonality, a class
action could not be certified.
The high cost of enforcement coupled with serious information
problems suggests that a private right of action for employees might
not be a cost-effective tool to reduce the incidence of fraud, even if
legal obstacles could somehow be overcome.
b. Victim Compensation Fund 
If private remedies are unlikely to succeed, public ones might do
better. When pursuing fraudulent firms, the SEC does not need to
show either reliance or damages, the barriers to private employee
fraud actions. The SEC can impose civil fines against firms so long
as the misrepresentation was material, was related to the sale of
securities, and was made with scienter.310 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act
also authorized the SEC to distribute civil fines that it collects from
fraudulent firms to the victims of fraud, and the SEC has distrib-
uted funds to defrauded shareholders in a number of high-profile
cases.311
As this Article argues, the shareholders are not the only victims
of fraud. A close reading of the securities acts and their legislative
history suggests that the SEC could adopt a rule authorizing the
creation of a fund to compensate all victims of fraud, including
nonshareholders. 
Section 308 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, entitled “Fair funds for
investors,” authorizes the SEC to distribute civil penalties collected
309. 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551, 2557 (2011) (requiring a “rigorous analysis” before a class may
be certified).
310. See supra notes 37-47 and accompanying text.
311. Barbara Black, Should the SEC Be a Collection Agency for Defrauded Investors?, 63
BUS. LAW. 317, 317 (2008).
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from securities violators to “the victims of such violation.”312
Elsewhere in the same section, the statute quite clearly limits its
scope to “injured investors,”313 but not in the provision that autho-
rizes the SEC to distribute funds collected from fraudulent firms
and individuals to the victims. At the least, the text of the Fair
Funds Statute does not preclude the inclusion of employees among
the victims of securities fraud.
The “words of the statute should be read in context, the statute’s
place in the overall statutory scheme should be considered, and the
problem Congress sought to solve should be taken into account.”314
The broader statutory structure of securities regulation suggests
that honest securities markets serve an important resource allo-
cation function in the economy. The Exchange Act itself notes that
fraud and manipulation “precipitate[ ], intensif[y], and prolong[ ]”
“[n]ational emergencies, which produce widespread unemployment
and ... affect the general welfare.”315 Moreover, the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act that adopted the Fair Funds Statute was motivated by “social
and economic dislocation, not simply investor losses.”316 It “refused
shareholders any more governance power, either in terms of voting
rights ... or private litigation”317 and instead increased public firms’
public accountability.318
In the light of the text of the Fair Funds Statute and the purpose
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, as well as securities regulation more
generally, section 308(a) could be said to be ambiguous under
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.319 If
so, a regulatory interpretation that includes employees among those
harmed by securities fraud, and thus plausibly “the victims of such
violation,”320 should pass constitutional muster. Just because a
course of action may be constitutionally permissible does not
312. 15 U.S.C. § 7246(a) (2006). 
313. Id. § 7246(c)(1)(A), (B).
314. PDK Labs. Inc. v. DEA, 362 F.3d 786, 796 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
315. 15 U.S.C. § 78b(4) (2006).
316. Langevoort, supra note 50, at 1828.
317. Id. at 1829.
318. See id. at 1828.
319. See 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (recognizing that ambiguity arises when “Congress has
not directly addressed the precise question at issue”).
320. 15 U.S.C. § 7246(a).
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suggest that it should be taken, particularly when it is not likely
that it would survive judicial scrutiny.321 
Alternately, the Article proposes that the SEC use its authority
to distribute fair funds to shareholders sparingly. Unless sharehold-
ers bear the full cost of fraud, the SEC should convey fines to the
Treasury.322 Assuming that at least some employees displaced by
securities fraud are eligible for unemployment and welfare benefits,
shareholders of fraudulent firms ought to contribute to covering the
Treasury’s cost and thus internalize a greater share of the cost of
fraud. The cost of capital should then more accurately reflect the
social cost of fraud.
c. Eliminating Securities Fraud Class Actions
Few legal instruments have been criticized for as long and by as
many different authors as the shareholder class action, and for good
reason. Class actions are costly; they overcompensate shareholders,
who can diversify away the cost of fraud, and fail to deter the
wrongdoer managers, as they virtually never pay out of pocket.323 In
a recent article, Professors Bill Bratton and Michael Wachter
proposed eliminating private shareholder class actions in exchange
for strengthened public enforcement.324 This Article supplies yet
another reason in favor of getting rid of the shareholder class action:
the cost and the distraction associated with litigation further harms
the firm’s employees, suppliers, and creditors. 
321. In Goldstein v. SEC, the D.C. Circuit signaled that it considered the SEC’s authority
to interpret statutes to be very limited. 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (invalidating the SEC’s
rule that provided that investors in hedge funds are “clients” of the hedge fund’s investment
adviser).
Even with statutory authorization, the D.C. Circuit might vacate a rule authorizing a
victim compensation fund if the rule failed the cost-benefit analysis, as illustrated by Business
Roundtable v. SEC, 643 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011). The D.C. Circuit panel struck down the
rule, arguing that the costs to investors exceeded the benefits. Measuring the victim
compensation fund rule by the same yardstick—the costs and the benefits to investors—would
inevitably doom it.
322. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(u)(d)(3)(C)(i) (2006) (“A [civil] penalty
imposed under this section shall be payable into the Treasury of the United States, except as
otherwise provided in [the fair funds] section.”).
323. See supra note 304 and accompanying text.
324. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 93, at 69-70.
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CONCLUSION
This Article makes and supports, theoretically and empirically,
a set of controversial claims. First, shareholders are not the only
group harmed by false securities disclosures. Second, shareholders
are in the best position to limit their exposure to fraud in the
secondary market. The firm’s employees, suppliers, vendors, cus-
tomers, and rivals cannot as easily self-insure against fraud. 
If so, then much of the modern debate about whether the benefit
of securities regulation to investors exceeds its cost is confused. The
underappreciation of the economic cost of securities fraud has led to
misguided legislative, enforcement, and policy choices, as well as
unwarranted criticism of valuable changes, such as audit reforms
ushered by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Hopefully, this Article can
redirect the debate and policy making to a more complete under-
standing of the cost of fraud.
